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AD HOC COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL HABEAS 
Meeting January 30, 1989 
Proposed Agenda 
1. Approval of Minutes of November 30 meeting. 
2. Limited response from letter to Judicial Conference? 
3. ABA Committee (Judge Sanders). 
4. Conference of Chief Justices (Judge Roney). 
S. Prof. Pearson's Memorandum. 
a. Chart showing number of days in state and federal 
courts from date of crime to execution. Relevanc~? 
b. Need for further information. Validity of claims 
that half of capital convictions reversed in 
federal court? 
c. Prof. Pearson's recommendations. 
6. Specific proposals. 
a. Chief Justice. 
b. Judge Hodges. 
c. Other -- Rule 9? 
7. Public hearings or submission of draft proposals to 
interested groups. 
a. ABA, ACLU, NAACP, State AGs, etc.? 
8. Next Meeting. 
AD HOC COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL HABEAS 
Meeting January 30, 1989 
Proposed Agenda 
1. Approval of Minutes of November 30 meeting. 
2. Limited response from letter to Judicial Conference? 
~1/1 
3. ABA Committee ( Judge Sanders). - f¼al ./ s~. 4/ ✓~ ~ ~6/1,1-pn'/ 
_ ~ />'lee..., 11,...zo T-e.-,. 
4 . 
5. 
Confe rence of Chief JustJfes ( Judge Roney). ✓ ~ / 7- L,"\ 
1JZrA (}~~ F 4 Jc' r- t;?~''{/ 
.-J <:> 'vd c{/-.,..Y (._l(S"f_ ..1/C(s; ~ J /'h.-hr1J t:e6 :r .lk....--,,io A~,.,.,,/AJJr, 
Prof. Pearson's Memorandum. 
a. Chart showing number of days in state and federal 
courts from date of crime to execution. Relevance? 
b. Need for further information. Validity of claims 
that half of capital convictions reversed in 
federal court? 
c. Prof. Pearson's recommendations. 
6. Specific proposals. 
a. Chief Justice. 
b. Judge Hodges. 
c. Other -- Rule 9? 
7. Public hearings or submission of d raft proposals to 
interested groups. 
a. ABA, ACLU, NAACP, State AGs, etc.? 




AD HOC COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL HABEAS 





Approval of Minutes of November 30 meeting. 
Limited response from letter to Judicial Conference? 
ABA Committee (Judge Sanders). 
Conference of Chief Justices (Judge Roney). 
Prof. Pearson's Memorandum. 
a. Chart showing number of days in state and federal 
courts from date of crime to execution. Relevance? 
/4. Need for further information. Validity of claims 
that half of capital convictions reversed in 
federal court? 
c. Prof. Pearson's recommendations. 
6. Specific proposals. 
/ a. Chief Justice. 
7 . 
b. Judge Hodges. 
c. Other -- Rule 9? 
') 
ublic hearings or submission of draft proposals to 
interested groups. 
a. ABA, ACLU, NAACP, State AGs, etc.? 





THE UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA 
Honorable Lewis F. Powell 
Associate Justice, Retired 
U.S. Supreme Court 
1 First St., NE 
Washington, DC 20543 
Honorable Paul H. Roney 
Chief Judge, U.S. Court 
of Appeals 
601 Federal Building 
144 First Avenue, S. 
St. Petersburg, FL 33701 
Honorable Charles Clark 
Chief Judge, U.S. Court 
of Appeals 
245 E. Capitol St. 
Room 302 
Jackson, MS 39201 
Gentlemen: 
SCHOOL OF LAW 
January 27, 1989 
Honorable Barefoot Sanders 
Acting Chief Judge 
U.S. District Court 
U.S. Courthouse 
1100 Commerce St. 
Room 15D28A 
Dallas, TX 75242 
Honorable Wm. Terrell Hodges 
Chief Judge, U.S. District 
Court 
U.S. Courthouse 
611 N. Florida Ave. 
Room 108 
Tampa, FL 33602 
Attached is a report for your review and discussion at our 
meeting scheduled for Monday. 
AMP/khb 
Attachment 
Albert M. Pearson 
Professor of Law 
Athens, Georgia 30602 
AN EQUAL OPPORTUN/1Y / AFFIRMATIVE ACTION INSTITUTION 
" 
AD HOC COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL 
HABEAS CORPUS REVIEW OF 
CAPITAL SENTENCES 
January 30, 1989 
AGENDA 
1. Discussion of Al Pearson's report on death penalty case 
procedural histories. 
2. Discussion of what additional statistical information, if any, 
needs to be compiled. 
3. Discussion of possible draft provisions for next meeting. 
4. Report from Chief Judge Roney about Orlando meeting with 
Conference of Chief Justices. 
5. Report from Judge Sanders about work of ABA Committee. 
6. Next meeting; time and place. 
" 
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REPORT (~J 
BACKGROUND: HISTORY OF ABA INVOLVEMENT IN Issui s CONCERNING 
FIREARMS CONTROL 
The American Bar Association has approved resolutions 
relating to the control of firearms four times: 
A. In 1965 and again in 1966, the Association adopted 
resolutions urging the United States Congress to enact 
legislation amending the Federal Firearms Act of 1934 to 
restrict firearms commerce in several ways. First, these 
resolutions called upon Congress to prohibit the shipment 
of firearms in interstate commerce except between federally 
licensed manufacturers, dealers and importers. Second, 
these resolutions called for the prohibition of the sale by 
federally licensed deal e rs of shotguns and rifles to 
per s ons under 18 years of age and the sale of all other 
types of firearms to persons under 21 years of age. Third, 
these resolutions urged that legislation be passed to 
prohibit persons of ques tionable background, such as 
felons, fugitives, and persons under indictment of 
felonies, from shipping or receiving firearms in interstate 
commerce. Fourth, the Association supported legislation to 
control both commerce in large caliber weapons and the 
importation of weapons in general. Finally, these 
resolutions backed a restriction in the sale of handguns to 
residents of the state where purchased. The goals of these 
resolutions were incorporated in large part into the Gun 
Control Act of 1968, which was passed by Congress in the 
wak~nally traumatic assassinations by firearms 
of civil rights leader Martin Luther King, presidential 
candidate Robert Kennedy, and President John F. Kennedy. 
B. 
Although not without weaknesses, the Gun Control Act of 
1968 (P.L. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213) did federally mandate 
significant restrictions on commerce in firearms. Under 
the Act, interstate gun purchases had to be made through 
federally licensed dealers. It also implemented modest 
recordkeeping requirements for such dealers as well as 
inspection procedures to ensure compl i ance with these 
recordkee ping req uirements. In addition, the Act 
prohibit e d the sale of firearms to minors, person s found 
mentally defective, drug addicts, and persons convicted of 
crimes punishable by a sentence of imprisonment for a term 
exceeding o ne year, unless that person can prove to the 
Secretary of the Treasury that he or she is not likely to 
act in a manner dangerous to the public safety. 
Ii/
In a 1973 resolution, the ABA reconfirmed its commitment 
the principle of effective control of the trafficking, 
sale, and possession of firearms. This resolution also 
supported legislation limiting the sale or possession of 
''Saturday Night Special" handguns. The resolution was 
based on "a firm conviction that the orga~ized legal 
community will continue to serve in its traditional role 
to 
of 
advisor to Congress and leader in its concern for law 
enforcement and criminal justice." (Report 107C, p.4) 
C. The Association passed its fourth resolution concerning the 
regulation of firearms in 1975 in response to the upsurge 
in violent crimes committed with firearms occurring at that 
time. The lengthy policy suggested minimum legislative 
measures to be taken to implement more effectively the Gun 
Control Act of 1968 and to give effect to the existing 
policies of the ABA. These measures included: ~--------
o incorporating into the prohibition of sales of firearms 
and ammunition by unlicensed persons the sale of parts 
or components of firearms; 
o defining explicitly the term "firearms for sporting 
purposes;" 
o upgrading the standards of eligibility for licensing of 
dealers, importers, and manufacturers and making the 
conferral of such licenses a discretionary rather than 
mandatory action by the Secretary of the Treasury; 
o mandating a waiting period between purchase and transfer 
of possession of a firearm during which time the 
transferor must report the transfer and the identity of 
the transferee to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and 
Firearms; 
o requiring dealers, manufacturers, transporters, and 
importers of firearms, ammunition, their parts or 
components to provide adequate and secure storage 
facilities in order to reduce the incidence of theft of 
such items and to report any losses or thefts of such 
items to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms; 
o changing the jurisdictional basis for prohibition of 
possession of a firearm, from reliance upon transport in 
interstate commerce to (1) constituting a burden on 
commerce, and (2) a threat to the effective enforcement 
of the Federal crime laws, including those laws designed 
to protect the safety of the Pres i dent; 
o encouraging the Judiciary to impose severe penalties for 
the possession or use of a firearm or facsimile in the 
commission of a crime; 
o urging that adequate federal appropriation and manpower 
resources be provided to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco 
and Firearms and to other prosecutive and investigative 
Federal law enforcement officials for the purposes of 
enforcing the Gun Control Act; 
o reviewing periodically the eligibility of handgun 
possessors consistent with the safeguards of due process; 
o encouraging additional legislation directing Federal 
D. 
~ 
i nves tigators a nd p r osecutors to a ssign a high priority 
to a l leged firearms offenses, particularly those which 
a r e repeated offenses c ommitte d by previously convicted 
felons; 
o urging effective cooperation among federal, state, and 
local law enforcement agencies in investigating and 
prosecuting firearms offenses; and 
o authorizing the President of the ABA or his designee to 
communicate the positions taken in this resolution to 
the appropriate individuals or entities inc l uding 
Congressional committees. 
In 1983, the ABA again stated its position on gun cont r ol 
in a resolution that vigorously opposed any repeal of the 
r egulatory provisions of the Gun Control Act o f 1968. The 
resolution _I,~ _~ e~~~port of 
rest ri ct i ons on handgun pos session a s well as the enactment 
and enforcement of appropriate penalties designed to deter 
violations of gun control laws. Moreover, in 1983 the 
Association slated gun control as a priority issue on the 
As ~ecia~-tto 's legislative agenda. As such, it became one 
ofL 20 issue to be designated a "priority matter" out of 
the 'eve 00 legislative issues on which the ABA focuses. 
In addition, 74.1 percent of 1,000 ABA leaders surveyed 
that year either agreed or strongly agreed with stringent 
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L. RALPH MECHAM 
DIREClOR 
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE 
0 ,. .a: , .. -x.,, ,. 
UNITED STATES COURTS 
'"Ot, c;\.v 
JAMES E. MACKUN. JR 
DEPUTY DIREClOR WASHJNGlDN, D .C. 20544 
Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Associate Justice, Retired 
March 6, 1989 
Supreme Court of the United States 
1 First Street, N. E. 
Washington, D. C. 20543 
Dear Justice Powell: 
WILLIAM R BURCHILL, JR 
GENERAL COUNSEL 
I am transmitting for your preliminary review dra of minutes 
from the last meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on anuary 3 • I am very 
sorry that this task took me so long to complete, bu explained to 
Hewitt Pate, the subject of judicial pay has really dominated my time the 
past few weeks. 
I shall await your corrections or comments upon these minutes and 
your direction for me to send them to the full committee membership. 
Thank you for your patience in this matter, and I look forward to seeing you 






JUDICIAL CONFERENCE AD HOC COMMITI'EE ON HABEAS 
CORPUS REVIEW OF CAPITAL SENTENCES 
Minutes of the Meeting of January 30, 1989 
The Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas Corpus Review of Capital Sentences 
held its third meeting at the Supreme Court Building, Washington, on January 30, 1989. 
Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., presided, and all other members of the committee were 
present. Also in attendance were Professor Albert Pearson of the University of Georgia 
Law School, Hewitt Pate, Law Clerk to Justice Powell, and William R. Burchill, Jr., 
General Counsel, Administrative Office of the United States Courts. 
Justice Powell first asked for the committee's approval of the minutes of its last 
meeting, held on November 30, 1988. Judge Roney noted that those minutes imply the 
reaching of a decision that the committee will not report to the March session of the 
Judicial Conference, and he inquired whether such a final decision has indeed been 
made. It was agreed that no such decision had been taken with finality in November but 
that it is now clear time does not permit any final report to be made by March. With this 
clarification the minutes were approved. 
Justice Powell then referred to the solicitation which he had made to all Judicial 
Conference members seeking their comments as to the committee's charge and the 
manner in which it might proceed. He noted that only one member of the Conference, 
Chief Judge Holloway of the Tenth Circuit, had responded to this invitation to comment, 
making it appear that there will not be substantial further input from the Conference 
membership. (Shortly thereafter a submission to the committee from Chief Judge Lay of 





Justice Powell then called upon Judge Sanders to review the progress to date of 
the American Bar Association committee that is conducting a parallel review of this 
issue. Judge Sanders stated that the ABA panel recently held an organizational meeting 
and will next meet on April 1 to review its reporter's initial research on the issues before 
it. He reported that the ABA group has scheduled public hearings for May 19 and 20 in 
Texas, June 1 7 in Los Angeles, and a hearing planned for the east coast in August or 
September. Justice Powell noted that the time schedule of the ABA effort will 
inevitably deviate from that of the Ad Hoc Committee, which is bound by the Judicial 
Conference schedule of biannual meetings while the ABA group is less structured in its 
timetable. 
Next Judge Roney reported on developments at the recent Conference of State 
Chief Justices meeting held in oriando regarding death penalty cases. He recounted that 
this conference both considered the "paper flow" problems of such cases and discussed 
possible changes in procedures. The conference also heard reports from Chief Justice 
Lucas of California, speaking for the ABA task force, and from Professor Pearson with 
respect to the work of the Ad Hoc Committee. Judge Roney further stated that the 
Conference of Chief Justices seems resigned to a continued Federal habeas role in such 
cases, whereas there may be some division of opinion within the ABA group as to the 
validity of such continued Federal involvement. 
At this point Judge Roney also discussed the plans of the Judicial Conference's 
Federal Courts Study Committee, which was about to hold its first meeting. He 
mentioned that Judge Weis, chairman of the Federal Courts Study Committee, planned to 
divide its efforts among three major subcommittees and anticipated preliminary public 
hearings this spring, the framing of draft proposals by fall, and then a second round of 
public hearings before submission of the committee's report in the spring of 1990. He 
-3-
added that it is anticipated the Federal Courts Study Committee will consider among its 
jurisdictional issues the manner in which capital cases come to the Supreme Court. 
Finally Judge Roney added that Senator Graham of Florida has just introduced a bill to 
place a statutory deadline upon Federal court disposition of state habeas corpus 
proceedings. 
Justice Powell next called upon Professor Pearson to comment upon the written 
materials which he had submitted to the committee, recounting death penalty case 
procedural histories. Professor Pearson discussed the various issues of timing raised in 
his memorandum. He suggested that a truer picture of overall time consumed in these 
proceedings might be obtained by recording the date of indictment. Justice Powell 
stated nevertheless that the date of the offense seems quite irrelevant for the 
committee's purposes, and Judge Roney suggested that the date of sentencing might be 
more relevant for purposes of post-conviction review. Professor Pearson responded that 
an anticipated follow-up request to the state attorneys general for further data will seek 
the dates of sentencing. Professor Pearson further noted that clear-cut information is 
lacking on why remands occurred in these cases. He added that it appears the amount of 
time consumed by state post-conviction review is very slight and that the preponderance 
of time consumed by state judicial proceedings is accounted for in trial and direct 
appeal. It was further pointed out that defendants are free to bypass state habeas 
entirely in many instances, depending upon the nature of the issues raised, without 
off ending the exhaustion requirement of Federal habeas corpus. 
Justice Powell then raised the question whether it is the appointment of counsel 
that triggers the onset of post-conviction filing. The responsive discussion concluded 
that it is normally the issuance of the state death warrant that serves as a triggering 
device for this purpose. Justice Powell inquired as to the feasibility of imposing a new 
r 
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requirement that the death warrant shall issue as soon as state judicial proceedings have 
concluded. The question was raised whether this would require state legislation, 
inasmuch as the effect of such a requirement, coupled with the appointment of counsel, 
would be to impose a financial burden on the states that Congress may lack the ability to 
set. Under existing law it was suggested that the setting of an execution date is useful in 
triggering the appointment of counsel, but such counsel do not necessarily have the 
competence and stature needed for capital cases. The use of a statute of limitations as a 
triggering mechanism for the involvement of counsel was further raised. Judge Roney 
stated that reliance upon the state death warrant for this purpose is unsatisfactory 
because it creates the negative appearance of Federal interference with state legal 
process. It was agreed that all legal issues should optimally be resolved before the death 
warrant issues, although Judge Sanders suggested that this would in many instances 
necessitate changes in state law. 
At this point Justice Powell turned the discussion to what additional procedural 
information is needed before the framing of tentative recommendations, and he also 
inquired whether there is support for the claim advanced by Judge Godbold and others 
that more than half of state-imposed death sentences have been reversed in Federal 
judicial review. Professor Pearson responded that the state attorneys general are 
unconvinced of this reversal rate but that it has proven difficult to elicit such actual 
statistical data from them for cases where executions have not ultimately occurred. 
In response to Justice Powell's question on other information required, 
Judge Sanders urged that the committee needs a measure of the elapsed time between 
the conclusion of state judicial proceedings and the filing of Federal habeas petitions. 
Judge Sanders noted that in Texas the prompt issuance of a death warrant by the 
convicting court is automatic, so that while no "down time" results at this stage, it is not 
clear that a speedier overall process results. 
-5-
Judge Clark urged the necessity to compile a data base recounting every 
significant event in all l 08 death penalty cases where executions have taken place. He 
further advocated that attention then be directed to the Federal collateral review 
consequence in each instance, noting that no predictability now exists in that process. In 
summarizing the expressed needs for additional data, Professor Pearson stated that 
procedural histories would be obtained of all death penalty cases except in Louisiana 
where they may not be available. It was recognized that it may not be possible to obtain 
reliable data on the Federal reversal rate of state death sentences, as considerable 
statistical interpretation would inevitably be required to arrive at such end. 
Judge Clark then recounted that the committee had made a threshold decision at 
its initial meeting not to seek the abolition of Federal habeas review of state 
convictions. He proposed the design of a mechanism whereby the state attorney general 
could initiate Federal collateral proceedings, either by a certification to the United 
States court of appeals or by seeking declaratory judgment in the district court. He 
expressed a preference for certification to the court of appeals level but noted that 
either alternative would avoid the present offense to Federalism of requiring a state 
death warrant to issue in order to activate the Federal judicial process, resulting in a 
quashing of the state warrant. 
Returning to the issue of a Federal statute of limitations, Professor Pearson 
stated that the states might be motivated thereby to set up a state-funded system for 
the appointment of counsel. Judge Hodges then referred to the new concept of Death 
Penalty Resource Centers now being funded partially by grants from Judiciary 
~
appropriations under the Criminal Justice Act as community defender organizations. 
Judge Clark added that most states have been very cooperative in assuming their 
financial share of supporting Death Penalty Resource Center operations. Justice Powell 
-6-
noted that the effective future execution of state capital sentences may depend upon the 
willingness of state governments to furnish and pay for counsel for collateral review. 
Mr. Burchill was then requested to obtain from the Administrative Office's Defender 
Services Division a memorandum of basic information regarding Death Penalty Resource 
Centers and to circulate this information to the committee. 
Justice Powell asked Professor Pearson to circulate to the committee an outline 
of the additional data needed, in order to afford every committee member the 
opportunity to expand or comment upon it. On the subject of public hearings he 
suggested that it is first necessary to develop concrete proposals. Judge Roney 
.----
recommended that draft proposals be circulated to address the problems identified. 
Professor Pearson agreed to attempt such drafts as a basis for further discussion. 
Justice Powell raised the issue whether the committee should consider proposing 
the elimination of the exhaustion requirement on access to Federal collateral review. 
Judge Hodges and Judge Sanders endorsed this suggestion, and Judge Hodges proposed in 
the alternative a system of state and Federal proceedings on parallel tracks with the 
Federal courts having the right to abstain from a decision unless the state were to waive 
exhaustion. Justice Powell also inquired about the desirability of reviewing the 
requirement for a certificate of probable cause to appeal. The consensus of the ensuing 
discussion was that such certificate is usually of little practical effect, although it is 
easier to effect summary disposition if the certificate has been denied. 
By way of further discussion on the causes of delay, Judge Hodges identified three 




ineffective assistance of counsel; ..-
ve;4• 
Brady claims of failure by the prosecution to disclose 
exculpatory materials; 












Otherwise Judge Hodges concluded that all necessary evidence has normally been 
adduced in state court so that there is rarely a need for Federal evidentiary hearings, 
avoiding further delay on this account. 
In summary, Justice Powell noted that Professor Pearson has been tasked (1) to 
circulate a memorandum on additional needed data and (2) to frame proposed remedies 
for the committee's consideration but with the understanding that only a narrative 
description of each proposal is now needed with draft legislation not required until later. 
No decision was reached regarding public hearings, but Justice Powell and Judge 
Sanders agreed that it might be desirable to seek written comments from the public after 
the committee has framed formal proposals for discussion. There are no plans for the 
conduct of public hearings at this time. 
Justice Powell stated that he foresees the need for at least two more meetings of 
the committee, tentatively projected for the month of April and some time during the 
summer. It was decided that the next committee meeting will be held on Friday, 
April 21 at 9:30 a.m. in the Supreme Court Building. The committee then adjourned. 
Respectfully submitted, 
William R. Burchill, Jr. 
General Counsel 
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1. Section (d) establishes two triggers for the SL. 
Subsection (d) (1) ~akes the SL applicable if a capital 
habeas applicant in fact was represented during state 
post-conviction proceedings and for an aggregate period 
of a year thereafter. The premise is a case-by-case 
determination of the applicability of-the SL provision. 
Upon the conclusion of state post-conviction 
proceedings, a lack of representation would toll the SL 
but once counsel comes back into the case, the clock 
resumes running. A tacking principle governs. Thus, five 
months of representation by Jones and eight months by 
Smith would make an aggregate period of representation 
of more than a year. If no federal habeas petition had 
been filed during that time, the SL would operate as a 
bar as specified in Section (e). 
Subsection (d) (2) enables a state to trigger the SL 
across-the-board in its own death penalty cases. The 
~pro~ is the establishment in accordance with 
section (f) of a program of legal representation in 
state and federal post-conviction proceedings. As 
written, the across-the-board option probably does not 
contain sufficient incentives to make the idea 
attractive to the states. They can argue with some force 
that all the costs of representation should not be borne 
by them. Some combination of state and federal fina ing 
is likely to oe tie ey. 
Section (e) attempts to define the point in time from 
which the SL would run. Two plternatives are suggested. 
The first uses the date at which "state remedies are 
exhausted." I borrowed the "exhaustion" standard from 
the SL provision of HR 1333. In my view it is highly 
ambiguous. The concept of exhaustion is never us ea to 
descri be a single moment in the process of state 
review---whether on direct appeal or during habeas 
corpus proceedings. In fact, it refers to a seri~s of 
instances throughout state review where the state 
judiciary has given all the consideration that it 
intends to afford to a particular issue. Linked as it is 
to discrete issues and the factual allegations in 
support of them, exhaustion can and regularly does take 
place at many different l:!mes a urlng stafe review. With 
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these reasons, "exhaustion" seems to be a particularly 
inapt starting point for a SL. 
We could try to assign a meaning to the term 
"exhaustion" for the purposes of this section that 
differs from the usage under 28 USC$ 2254(b). But the 
potential for confusion hardly seems worth it. What we 
seek is a clearly defined terminal" point in state 
judicial consideration of criminal cases---a point that 
objectively reflects the end of the state prisoner's 
efforts. Depending on the nature of the issues involved, 
it could occur after direct appeal or after state 
post-conviction proceedings. But once state review is 
I concluded and •the state pris. oner shifts his attention to the federal courts, the premise of this proposal is that he is entitled to a year to filed his application for 
federal habeas relief. _ 
The alt native language I propose would have the SL 
run from the 'las ispositive order on the merits" 
issued by a state Ce-\H'. -a-1:ke he exhaus ion concept, 
this language describe a single, identifiable point in 
time from which to measure the operation of the SL bar. 
As I conceive of this . approach, it would not apply to 
rulings denying motions for rehearing or motions for 
extraordinary reconsideration of prior dispositive 
rulings. In my view, this language (or something based 
on the same rationale but more aptly phrased) is the way 
to go. 
A further advantage of the alternative language is 
that while it makes the operation of the SL independent 
of the exhaustion requirement, the SL rule still serves 
as a powerful disincentive against the filing of mixed 
petitions. It deals with one of the mos serious but .h~ 
unintended consequences of Rose v. Lund in the death ~ ----
penalty context. If' a state prisoner seeks federal ~f 
relief and raises an unexhausted claim, the SL clock · ~ 
would continue to run from the- date of the "last ~ 
dispositive order on the merits" in state court. Nothing 
in this proposal would deny the state prisoner the right 
to rush back to state to· cure his exhaustion problem. He 
would required to do . so, however, within the time frame 
of the one year SL---a difficult, if not impossible, 
task in most instances. ,~ 1- . ,1 1 7 . 
?ic, f --- , ~ - ~ ~ ,-0..~ 
Is this unfair to a state prisoner under death ~ 
sentence? Not in my view since he bears none of these ~ 
consequences if he is unrepresented. On the other hand, '-1,,-
if the state prisoner is represented in state 
post-conviction proceedings and afterwards as this ~h 
proposal contemplates, the factual record built up in ~ 
the state courts ought to be entirely adequate to  
sustain all legal theories appropriate in federal habeas 
proceedings. Under these assumptions, the presentation 
of unexhausted claims to a federal court is difficult to 







excuse. This proposal exacts a price for such 
"afterthought" contentions, but it is one that seems 
fair in view of the representation in death penalty 
cases that this proposal seeks to encourage. Moreover, 





Section (e) recognizes that there are certain issues 
that a state prisoner might not fairly be expected to 
raise within the context of the one year SL and it 
creates exceptions for each of them. The SL runs 
separately if any one of the exceptions is applicable; 
it runs from the time at which the disability is 
removed. The rationale behind these exceptions is 
self-evident. 
i,,r j ..,., yl,J---' 
~~ In practice, however, the newly discovered evidence exception will probably be the source of most last ditch 
litigat,i"on efforts in capital cases. I see no way to 
avoid ·this. Bare allegations of this typ e are easy to 
make. Meritorious allegations are, of course, quite 
unusual. In principle, however, if there is previously 
unknown and unavailable evidence suggestive of a state 
capital prisoner's innocence, the federal courts should 
always remain open to consider it. This particular 
exception suggests the limit of the present proposal; it 
seeks to promote fairer and more efficient consideration 
of capital cases but it does not attempt to deal with 
the chaos freque~tly associated with last minute 
attempts to stay /executions. 
Section (f) needs little elaboration beyond what I 
have said in previous memoranda. If a state wishes to 
qualify .for the SL across-the-board, the program ought 
,,.,,,t.,,-V" to compensate counsel and have controls that assure 
1 
~,..,J' p.,,v compete!!SY · Once a program is approved by he Court of 
j-.f"?'' r0 Appeal's,~ there will not be any further need for 
~~ case-by-case review of the competency of individual 
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CORPUS STATUTE OF LIMITATION PROVISION 
2244 of title 1 8, United States Code, is amended by 
~•t~n~-~~d thereo f the following new subsections: 
"(d) In all capital cases involving a person in custody 
pursuant to a judgment of a state court, a one year period of 
limitation shall apply to the filing of an application for a writ 
of habeas corpus under this chapter. This period of limitation 
shall apply if either of the following conditions is satisfied: ~ 
~~ ~~ -r:;S, j / ?- " ( 1) the ' state prisoner was represen~ by _ counsel ~,.::,,....' 
~ ~bf during all state post-conviction proceedings an; f ~ ,P., 
Lr 1) .~~-~ ~ ~• ~~~ ~1A aggregate period of at least a year following the ~~.b-'; 
~~~ ,I- completion of such proceedings; ~ 
@~ the state, under the standards and procedures set 
firt' "#~✓ ~ forth in subsection (f), has a program that provides 
~ counsel for state prisoners under death sentence during fr'-.1. - -or',J~-r".,t, <:.!,.l st: te and federal £:>s ::conviction proceedings and :Sr;;- - - - -
('A\ 17,v--~ the state prisoner was in fact represented by counsel 
~ pursuant-to such a program. 
~ "(e) The one year period of limitation shall run from [the 
:::~ time at which state remedies are exhausted] [the date of the last_ 
V".~ dispositive order on the merits issued by a state court prior to 
~ the application for a writ of habeas corpus under this chapter]. 
~,.J.,,'1 It shall operate as a ~ r to all issues actually litigated on 
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~ to those issues th~~t= sed at either stage 
of review. The one year period shall run separately with respect 
to any issue or issues for which the exhaustion requirement could 
not have been satisfied because: 
"(1) the state created an impediment to post-conviction 
review in violation of the Constitution or laws of the 
United. States; 
"(2) the federal right asserted has been newly 
r ecognized and could not have been asserted in any prior 
post-conviction proceeding; or 
11 (3) the factual basis of the claim or claims could not 
have been discovered through the exercise of reasonable 
diligence. 
"(f) A state may qualify for the one year period of 
limitation if it establishes a comprehensive program providing 
for representation of capital defendants in state and federal 
post-conviction proceedings. To qualify, the capital 
representation program must receive the approval of a majority of 
the active judges of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals 
in which the state is situated. The Court of Appeals shall 
approve a program of capital representation if it provides 
adequate compensation and otherwise assures the availability of 
competent counsel for all capital defendants desirous of 
representation." 
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Professor Pearson's Report of April 10 
As I read his 25 page report for the first time, I 
make the following comments as a memory refresher. 
Right to Counsel (pp. 1-11) 
Pearson noted at the outset that there are "serious 
[ethical] questions being raised about the tactics of de-
fense lawyers, but their tactics are not before us. The 
availability of counsel "at the post conviction phas"e is 
"perhaps the most pressing issue in the death penalty area." 
The Supreme Court's decision in Murray v. Giarantano (from 
CA4) may shed some light, but will not resolve the basic 
problem of general availability beginning at the state post 
conviction phase. 
Al emphasizes that "adequate legal representation" 
involves more than concern about fairness to persons facing 
execution. Lawyers are officers of the courts as well as 
advocates, and their handling of capital cases should also 
/ "be compatible with efficient administration of justice." 
(p. 2-3). 
As to the present situation, Al notes that 19 
states now provide for the appointment of counsel in state 
post conviction proceedings." (n. 6, p. 4). 
Also in 1988 Congress amended the Criminal Justice 
Act to authorize the 
sel in death penalty 
"appointment and compensaJ.i .J~. ~ coun-
cases when they get to t ~ tem." 
f 2 • 
( p. 4) Also, as I have noted in my consideration of "re-
source centers" these now exist in 13 states, congressional 
funding is available. ( p. 5) 
Al's recommendation with respect to counsel 
commences on p. 7 of his memo: 
(1) Counsel should be provided "on request". It 
is not clear to me when and to whom the request is to be 
made. Who will make the request? When Al speaks of "habeas 
corpus" I assume is talking about state as well as federal 
collateral review. He notes that "recent amendments to the 
Criminal Justice Act l argely occur at the federal level. 
The serious gap in our system is the state level. 
Al sees the following benefits from compelling the 
states to appoint counsel in every capital case upon comple-
tion of direct appeals: (a) would meet the criticism that 
enforcement of the death penalty is procedurally unfair; (b) 
where the defendant has counsel, the state's counsel (attor-
ney general) can move "aggressively for the full development 
of all relevant legal issues" at this early stage, (c) 
availability of counsel would strengthen "the presumption of 
correctness of findings under §2254(d); and (d) the applica-
tion of state procedural default rules in death cases can be 
made with greater force. 
There would be an assurance of fairness from the 
outset that would justify a 'journey through the legal sys-
✓ 3. 
tern, and should settle the question "whether or not an exe-
cution can be carried out." (p. 8). 
Al correctly notes that funding of his proposal 
will be a critical matter. Indeed, states already have been 
reluctant to pay counsel adequately even for trials and ap-
peals in the state system. Also, counsel are reluctant to 
undertake defense of capital punishment cases. 
Finally, Al notes that if the committee agrees with 
his counsel proposal, it probably would be necessary to ad-
dress some of the details of implementation. What would be 
the mechanism for finding and appointing counsel at the 
state habeas phase of death penalty litigation? Should the 
specifics in this respect be left up to the states (as I 
think may well be necessary), or should we recommend the 
establishment of a joint federal/state entity? Also there 
will be a question as to the need for monitoring death pen-
alty cases and how this could be done? Al would favor, if 
it were feasible, to centralize at the state level the ap-
pointment process. In most states, this is now handled on a 
de facto basis. (p. 11). 
Statute of Limitation (pp. 11-16) 
Al notes that several of the habeas corpus reform 
proposals submitted to Congress in recent years have includ-
ed "statutes of limitations". But each of these has been 
included in a proposal to limit dramatically the scope of 
all federal habeas review in §2254 cases. Al states that he 
4 . 
knows of no congressional proposal that addresses only prob-
lems of judicial administration in death cases. He thinks 
the only situation in which a limitation makes sense is in 
death cases where the incentive to litigate is vastly dif-
ferent for death row inmates. It is rare - almost never -
that the defendant is not guilty of murder. Thus, a death 
row defendant usually is "resigned to the fact of indefinite 
commitment as a minimum." The objective is to defer the 
death sentence. 
The state's concern is "both starting and stopping" 
the post conviction review process. A statute of limita-
tions in death row cases would perform double duty: "It 
would spur the death row inmate to initiate post conviction 
review and, in conjunction with doctrines of_"bar and proce-
dural default," would bring that review to a conclusion. At 
present, only the setting of an execution date motivates a 
death row inmate to pursue post conviction remedies." Apart 
from these advantages, a statute of limitations would mini-
mize "the waste of time and judicial resources now devoted 
to seeking a stay of execution." (pp. 12-13). 
A 
Al explains how his limitations proposal would 
work: 
(1) It should be linked to the appointment of com-
petent counsel in both state and federal post conviction 
proceedings. 
5. 
(2) The limitation period would "span the time 
period from the end of state direct appeal to the filing of 
§2254 petition in federal district court. There would be 
two steps that are not subject to a timely filing require-
ment: (i) the transition from direct appellate review to 
state habeas corpus review, and (ii) the jump from "state to 
federal habeas corpus proceedings." Al notes that "from the 
viewpoint of finality of state criminal convictions and ju-
dicial administration generally, these unregulated time gaps 
are hard to justify." (Hew, I do not understand Al's de-
scription of how the statute of limitations would work in 
practice). (pp. 13-16) Perhaps if I reread it, it would 
become clearer. 
(3) The statute of limitations "should be trig-
gered by reference to either of two events, whichever occurs 
later: Whenever for state law purposes, the judgment of 
criminal conviction becomes final on direct appeal; or the 
date on which competent post conviction counsel is appoint-
ed. Al thinks his dual "triggering" event is unique in that 
it has never been proposed previously. It has the advantage 
of avoiding "slippery questions of state and federal law as 
to when a statute of limitations should begin to run be-
cause, in the end, the running of the statute would commence 
with the appointment of counsel." (I want to discuss this 
with Hew.) 
6 • 
(4) There must be certain "tolling" rules to as-
sure fairness. These, in proposed statutes for habeas cor-
pus reform, have included three exceptions: (i) newly dis-
covered evidence; (ii) newly recognized constitutional 
rights (by the Supreme Court?); and (iii) for rights a pris-
oner was unable to assert due to the unconstitutional action 
of the state - e.g., a Brady violation." In addition, Al 
would add a rule tolling the limitations for any time prior 
to the filing of federal habeas when the death row inmate's 
case is pending before a court of competent jurisdiction. 
(I would like to see some examples). Al would prefer a two 
year, rather than a one year, limitations period. 
Limit Supreme Court Jurisdiction (pp. 16-18). 
State prisoners have a benefit not possessed by any 
other "class of litigants in the United States." They may 
petition for cert "a minimum of three times". (Hew, I do 
not understand this.) 
The existence of multiple opportunities for Supreme 
Court review of state criminal convictions is an accident of 
history. There are strong reasons for change. 
Al would defer Supreme Court review in death cases 
"until after all lower court review - state and federal -
has been completed. (See also Al's note 24, p. 17). 
Under current practice, Supreme Court review in 
death cases is like focusing on a "moving target", as the 
record can change at least twice more: (1) once in state 
post conviction proceedings, and (2) again during federal 
habeas review. 
7 • 
Al's suggestion is that Supreme Court review in 
death cases should be deferred to the end of the process so 
that the Supreme Court could function as "the court of last 
resort on constitutional issues." Al's arguments in support 
of a single Supreme Court review are persuasive on their 
face. I need to give the suggestions more careful thought. 
What changes in statutes would be necessary? 
Automatic Stay of Execution (pp. 18-20). 
There would be a mandatory stay of execution if 
there is a statute of limitations. Such a statute would be 
a substitute for the setting of an execution date. Al, who 
has served as counsel for capital defendants, makes the 
following interesting statement: 
"All who are involved in death penalty liti-
gation that stay of execution practice con-
sumes an enormous amount of time and energy 
and is largely unnecessary - certainly during 
the first time through the post conviction 
review. Why not eliminate this feature of 
death penalty practice, and conserve scarce 
legal resources for an examination of the 
merits of each cases. An automatic stay of 
execution would serve this purpose." 
Al states that if the committee favors this idea, 
three additional consideration should be addressed. 
(i) What would trigger the automatic stay of exe-
cution; and (ii) what should be the duration of the stay?; 
and (iii) finally should there be a basis for staying execu-
tions after the automatic stay of execution has expired. Al 
thinks that the "trigger for the automatic stay of execution 
and the statute of limitations should be an identical event. 
Exhaustion Requirement (pp. 20-24) 
The total exhaustion of Rose v. Lundy (455 U.S. 509 
(1982)) can be an often is a source of delay in death penal-
ty cases. The Rose doctrine should be modified. Counsel 
tend to change at various stages, often counsel with various 
skills and views as to issues and argument. New counsel 
during post conviction proceedings almost invariably asserts 
new issues. 
If I understand Al correctly, states should be en-
couraged "to waive the exhaustion requirement." This al-
ready is now being done with greater frequency in death 
cases. 
Al would go directly to the root of the problem. 
He woul not limit federal habeas corpus review in §2254 
cases to those claims actually presented to the state courts 
for adjudicated. In describing how his proposals with re-
spect to exhaustion would work, he states that a death pen-
alty litigant could raise the following issues in federal 
courts. 
(1) All constitutional issues raised either at 
trial or on direct appeal; (2) any constitutional issue 
properly raised in a state post conviction proceedings; and 
(3) any constitutional issue newly raised in state post con-
8 • 
viction proceedings that was not raised at trial or on di-
rect appeal that probably should have been. A major example 
of an unreviewable issue would be the assistance of state 
habeas counsel." But see Al's note 31. 
Certificate of Probable Cause (pp. 24-25) 
This is a minor issue, but Al would limit the cer-
tificate of probably cause requirement to appeals from ad-
verse federal District Court rulings in death cases - at 
least on the first federal habeas review. As I understand 
Al, he would prefer to eliminate the CPC. 
Al's Conclusion (p. 25) 
His conclusion add little or nothing beyond saying 
that his proposal would have to be "voluntary so far as 
state participation is concerned." 
L.F.P., Jr. 
Note to Hew: 
As usual you anticipated a need when you said on 
Saturday that you would give me a summary of Al's proposals, 
including your opinion as to each of them. 
It would have been helpful if Al had, in a conclu-
sion, summarized the type of statute or statutes that he 
tentatively recommends. I suppose there would be major 
amendments to §2254, or .a complete revision of it and possi-
bly other sections. I suppose some thought should be given 




strength of Al's proposals, as I tentatively understand them 
is that they would provide a framework for voluntary action 
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Ad Hoc Committee - Meeting of April 21 
See my memo of April 17 that purports to summarize 
(to some extent) Pearson's 25-page report of April 10. This 
briefer memo is more sharply focused, identifying what Pear-
son believes is established or clear, and what specifically 
may be done. 
Right to Counsel 
The availability of competent counsel at the post 
conviction phases - state and federal - is the "most press-
ing issue" on the agenda in death cases. 
Lawyers are "officers of the courts", and their 
representation in a death case not only should promote fair-
ness for the client, but be compatible with "efficient ad-
ministration of justice". 
States are responding to the need for counsel. 
(See Pearson, p. 4 ) . A new awareness of the need for coun-
sel is indicated as 19 states now provide by law for the 
appointment of counsel. Two states leave the appointment to 
"judicial discretion", and a number of states provide for 
counsel where it is determined that the defendant has a mer-
itorious claim(?), or where a hearing is required. 
Perhaps the best evidence of awareness is the fact 
that Congress in 1988 amended the Criminal Justice Act to 
authorize the appointment and compensation of counsel when 
2 • 
cases reach the federal courts. 
tion) . 
(Ask: adequacy of compensa-
Thirteen states now have "Resource Centers" that 
receive federal and state funding for employment of counsel. 
Regardless of the outcome of Giarantano (CA4 held 
that the Constitution requires appointment by states of 
counsel), our committee should make recommendations. 
Pearson's Recommendation as to Counsel 
(1) Counsel should be provided "on request without 
the necessity of first filing a habeas corpus petition 
(state or federal?) or whether there is a need for an evi-
dentiary hearing, or a showing of probability of success on 
the merits." There is a need in state proceedings as the 
Criminal Justice Act largely accomplishes this at the feder-
al level. 
(See Al's views as to the "several benefits from 
his proposal that counsel be provided for death row inmates 
in every case where request is made regardless of other con-
siderations). See pp. 7 and 8 his memo. 
If there is agreement on Al's recommendation that 
counsel be appointed upon request, our committee probably 
would have to consider the mechanism (procedure) for finding 
and appointing counsel. I suppose the request would have to 
be made to the state attorney general or perhaps to the 
prosecuting attorney. Thedeath row inmate must be advised of 
his or her right to counsel. 
3 . 
There also should be some notification procedure to 
assure continuity of representation - e.g., when a counsel 
resigns. 
Statute of Limitations 
Bills before Congress have included statutes of 
limitations in all habeas corpus cases, but Al says that it 
only makes sense to have a statute of limitations in death 
penalty cases. Congress has not focused on this. The in-
centives to litigate are far different for death row in-
mates. As long as things are quiet and no date for execu-
tion has been set they have no incentive to request counsel. 
A limitations period therefore is necessary. 
A statute of limitations, according to Al, would 
perform double duty. It would spur the death row inmate 
(assuming he understands it) to initiate post conviction 
review, and in conjunction with doctrines of bar and proce-
dural default bring that default to conclusion." (pp. 12, 
13). 
The question how a statute of limitations would 
work is addressed by Al (p. 13, et seq.). It should be 
linked to the appointment of competent counsel to represent 
the inmate in both federal and state post conviction pro-
ceedings. The limitation would span the time from the end 
of state direct appeal to the filing of a §2254 petition in 
federal court. This is not clear to me. 
Friday. 
I should ask Al on 
4 . 
Al says the statute of limitations "should be trig-
gered by reference to one of two events whichever occurs 
later: (i) the judgment of criminal conviction becomes 
final on state direct appeal; or (ii) the date on which com-
petent post conviction counsel is appointed. This is an 
identifiable date that rarely can be questioned. Seep. 14. 
Limit Supreme Court Jurisdiction 
As I have noted in my first memo, Al says that 
state prisoners (not just capital prisoners) may petition 
the United States Supreme Court for cert a minimum of three 
times, namely: (i) when the state supreme court affirms the 
conviction and sentence, (ii) a second petition may be made 
to the Supreme Court when the state supreme court again af-
firms the conviction on state collateral review, and (iii) a 
third time at the end of the first federal habeas consider-
ation of the case. I add here that these three petitions to 
the Supreme Court are not only permitted; they are common-
place. 
Al also notes that Supreme Court review in death 
cases is similar to focusing "on a moving target''. There 
can be changes in the record, resourceful counsel can think 
of new issues (including, as I know, frivolous ones, etc. 
Under Al's plan "once the Supreme Court has acted in a death 
penalty case without granting relief to a state prisoner it 
would be the end of federal intervention." Society would 
5. 
have afforded the litigation competent counsel and a full 
and fair opportunity to litigate all constitutional issues. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
ss 
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Ad Hoc Committee - April 21 meeting 
The following are questions that need clarification 
of Al Pearson's proposal. 
1. Counsel is to be made available (at state and 
federal expense) when the state conviction becomes final. 
If counsel is offered, and no execution date as been set, 
why would the defendant want counsel? Possibly the answer 
is that an automatic stay of execution would come into ef-
fect and remain until the course of review had been complet-
ed. 
2. The statute of limitations would commence t6 
run when counsel is appointed and has agreed to serve. This 
could be an ambiguous "time". A more positive date must be 
established. For example, appointed counsel could be re-
quired to have his appointment, and willingness to served 
noted of record in court. This would be a duty. 
3. The automatic stay of execution would go into 
effect when counsel notes his appointment with the court 
that then has jurisdiction. The stay would remain until the 
final decision of the case. What happens when an appointed 
counsel quits? 
7 
4. The limitations statute would be tolled when 1tA.:> 
1 cW/~(._£~ 
the prisoner files for state habeas review, and remain dur-
ing the state proceedings. At the conclusion thereof the 
2 • 
statute would resume running, and the prisoner would have to 
file his federal petition within the remaining portion of 
the limitations period. Identifying specifically these 
dates will not be easy but not impossible. 
5. On federal habeas, the prisoner could present 
only the claims that were presented in state court. Would 
these include claims presented but not acted on by the state (2.,..J/k ~ -- , 
court? Presumably not. What about the exhaustion require-
ment? 
6. At the end of federal review (DC and CA) - and 
o!!..!_y_J;hen - could the prisoner file for cert with the 
Supreme Court. There would be no need for certificates of 
probable cause. If cert is denied, the "one trip through" 
the system would end, and the prisoner could be executed in 
the absence of a newly recognized constitutional right, new-
ly discovered evidence, or a Brady violation. 
7. The statute of limitations would be tolled, I 
suppose, when counsel retires or quits. There may be weeks 
before a new counsel is appointed. These dates are likely 
to be "fuzzy" unless counsel is required to file with the 
appropriate court a formal resignation, and a court order 
entered when new counsel reports for duty. 
8. The Committee may suggest we do nothing until 
Murry v. Giarantano is decided. If CA4 were affirmed, there 
would be a constitutional right to counsel in state habeas 





Even so, Al should not delay drafting a 
until that case is decided. It may not come 
down until the final day of the Term is late June or early 
July. 
9. A successive habeas petition would be allowed 
only for: (i) a newly recognized constitutional right; 
3. 
(ii) newly discovered evidence; and (iii) Brady violation. 
Under Teague v. Layne (Feb. 22) the Court at long last 
adopted Harlan's (and mine) approach to non-retroactivity in 
habeas cases. There therefore will be little "new law" ap-
plicable to habeas. But there two exceptions. 
The "newly discovered evidence exception" should be J ~ -
applicable only a colorable showing of innocence, as I would 
~'- \. 
hold under Kuhlmann v. Wilson (Henry Friendly's view). 
Thus, absent such a showing there would be no exception for 
new evidence. This would usually apply also to Brady viola-
tions. 
10. With respect to the present requirement of 
exhaustion of state remedies, Pearson's proposed review 
would be limited to claims actually presented to state 
courts for adjudication. [My earlier memo is incorrect on 
this point.] Hew notes that Al's proposal is an expansion 
of the rule in Engle v. Isaacs, 456 U.S. 107, 125-126, n. 
28. In that case we held that federal habeas corpus courts 
may dismiss as procedurally barred an unexhausted claim if 





SUMMARY OF PROFESSOR PEARSON'S PROPOSAL 
Prof. Pearson's proposal essentially would provide one 
counseled trip through the dual system of collateral review. 
It would work as follows: Once a conviction becomes final, 
a prisoner under capital sentence would be offered counsel 
to assist with state and federal habeas review pursuant to a 
(yet to be determined) system. Once counsel is appointed, a 
statute of limitations would begin to run as to all claims 
cognizable in federal habeas. At this time, an automatic 
stay of execution would come into effect and remain in place 
until the course of review had run. The prisoner would have 
one (or two) years under the statute within which to file in 
federal court. Time would stop running ( statute would be 
tolled) when the prisoner filed for state habeas review, and 
the statute would remain tolled during state proceedings. 
When state proceedings concluded, the statute would pick up 
(presumably where it left off) and the prisoner would have 
to file his federal petition within the prescribed time or 
be time barred (subject to exceptions). 
At the federal stage, the prisoner could present only 
those claims that were actually presented in state court; 
others (absent an exception) would be deemed waived/barred. 
Only at the end of federal review ( including an appeal to 
the CA without need for a CPC) could the prisoner file for 
cert in the S. Ct. Once cert was denied, the "one trip 
' 
through" would be at an end, the automatic stay would lift, 
and the prisoner would be in the hands of the state system. 
Further federal review would be available only on one of 
three conditions: ( 1) newly recognized constitutional 
rights; (2) newly discovered evidence; or (3) prosecutorial 
misconduct that prevented earlier litigation of a claim 
(i.e., Brady violations). Only under one of these 
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/Y" '11 ~~ Two principal topics are discussed in this memorandum: (1) 
~ areas where the development of some statistical or illustrative 
?, . :; 1 :-,,,,,,r 
~~ information might be helpful to justify legislative proposals e--. coming from the Committee; and (2) habeas corpus reform measures 
;., ~ /that have been presented in Congress or advanced in other forums 
~ over the past two decades. In connection with the habeas corpus 
reform measures, I have noted the major arguments for and against 
each measure. 
II. POTENTIAL NEEDS FOR EMPIRICAL DATA 
A. Case Load Burden 
One issue that the Committee will probably have to address 
at some point is whether the focus on death penalty cases is 
justified. When you look at total habeas corpus filings annually 
for the past two decades, it would be hard to say that such 
filings have contributed inordinately to the federal court 
workload. For example, total civil filings between 1966 and 1986 
increased by 359%. 1 In contrast, total prisoner filings (federal 
and state) increased by 469%. 2 A closer look at total prisoner 
1. The jump was from 70,906 to 254,828. Wilkes, Federal and 
State Postconviction Remedies and Relief, $ 8.2 (1st ed. 
1983)(1986 supplement). 




filings, however, puts an important perspective on these figures. 
The great bulk of this increase has been in prisoner civil rights 
actions, particularly section 1983 suits by state prisoners, and -----------
not because of a dramatic increase in section 2254 petitions. In 
fact, section 2254 petitions between 1966 and 1986 increased by 
only 169%, 3 a rate which is considerably below the 359% 
increase experienced in total civil filings. 4 
This review suggests---in my view strongly---that the -~ Committee's focus on capital cases is valid. For at least two 
~µ reasons, they present the federal (and state) courts with unique 
~~ -~ fairness, procedural and administrative problems. One is ~~-- ~ -
~ that death row inmates have an incentive to exploit every 
~,~ opportunity to delay the processing of their cases and to 
~· relitigate issues which sharply differentiates them from inmates 
sentenced to a term of years. That point seems so intuitively 
obvious that a search for more documentation would be a 
effort. 
waste of ~ 
The second i~ that, as a sub-category of section 2254 
filings, death penalty cases 
courts than their actual 
__..._.__ .....__.--..-_..---
readily available such as: 
h ,, 
pose a greater burden on the federal 
~&.~ ------------
numbers reflect. Some supporting is 
A 
(1) data showing that the death row 
population is more rapidly than the courts can process 
3. The increase was from 5,339 section 2254 petitions in 
1966 to 9,045 in 1986. By comparison, the jump in state prisoner 
section 1983 actions was from below 1,000 to more than 20,000 
over the same time. Id. 
4. This figure would still be 350% even if you excluded all 







these cases to a final disposition; and (2) according to the 
report of the Spangenburg Group issued in September, 1987, there 
is literally a flood---in comparison to what we have experienced -
thus far---of death penalty cases headed for the federal courts. 
The r eport stated that 174 death penalty cases were pending at 
the federal district court level and 97 before various circuit 
co urts or on petition for certiorari. For fiscal year 1988, it 
predicted that 304 death penalty cases would be in a position to 
shift from state to federal court; for fiscal year 1989 the 
number predicted was 340. 5 
Even though these figures su ggest a crisis in the volume of 
work soon to face the federal courts in 
lv-<--~ 
death penalty cases, we 
could attempt to get more detailed information about the actual 
-"\ ~ '-- '- '-- ....___ ------- ~ .. , --------
(J) judicial time devoted to an average death penalty case (if such a 
thing exists). For example, how many hou ~s each year does a 
\...._L-J 
federal judge spend on all his or her duties? What percentage of 
" l'L ~
this time would be consumed by a death penalty case? When sitting 
2,_ .,-(____ . 
as a district judge? Wh e e 3~:: in g as a circuit judge - -- #ith _______, -----= . 
'--
opinion writin g~ responsibility and without it? The question ----~--- ---.....---......----- ---:, 
posed is not simply whether death penalty cases are too much work 
9_ ,I. ~ or too hard, but whether th_'.'Y consume so much time that the other 
Lt"Y- 1 business of the federal courts is unjustifiably put to one side • .A_ f;-l in 
PV ? Information of this sort might be helpful/deciding whether death 
'(JN4-"f penalty cases should have special procedures making it possible 
1.- ~~-----
~ 5. Report of the Spangenberg Group, Caseload and Cost 
Projections for Federal Habeas Corpus Death Penalty Cases in FY 






to handle them more efficiently without compromising fairness or 
the scope o f federal review. 
A related question is the intensity of the pressure under 
which federal (and state) judges often must work in death penalty 
cases. Here I refer to the role that death warrants and stays of 
execution presently play in moving a case through the federal and 
state systems. Judge Sharp's ~ atement of February 26, 1988 
~
provides a graphic picture of the the dynamics of this process.6 
Do we need to delve into this more? For reasons mentioned 
elsewhere in this memorandum, this information would support the 
use of a statute of limitation as the mechanism for an orderly 
transition of capital cases from state to federal court. 
B(_~~/!12~) 
In this section, I try to identify reasons for delay in the 
? ? . . 
handling of capital habeas cases that are structural or doctrinal 
in nature. 
As a preliminary matter, some comment about the problem of 
delay seems appropriate. One reason for delay in death penalty 
cases is due to the fact of lower federal court review of state 
criminal convictions. Unless the Committee wants to recommend 
change in the substantive scope of federal habeas review, this 
cause for delay is something that we have to be aware of but 
, .l~ 6. Statement of the Honorable G. Kendell Sharp before the ? 
l)I,....,.., Subcommittee on Government Information, Justice and Agriculture 
~ of th~ House Committee on Government Operations. 
~-I»- ' 4 
need not emphasize. 
Of the 101 executions in the United States since Furman, 90 
were resisted legally by the prisoner. In states that have had 5 
or more executions (Texas, Florida, Louisiana and Georgia), the 
average time from the date of the crime to the date of execution 
has ranged from 5 years 10 months in Louisiana to 9 years 10 
months in Georgia. To the extent that any of this time is due to 
the necessity of a retrial whether on guilt-innocence or the 
imposition of the death penalty, the delay is a result of a 
/c 
7 
substantive legal judgment about the fairness of the state } 
criminal trial. / 
~ As you all know, the numbe :_ of r :_:ersals in death penalty 
~rases has been high---indeed far higher than in cases involving 
~~ inmates sentenced to a term of years. 7 Of course, not all of the 




federal court, but many, perhaps a 
To death penalty opponents, this 
I 
~· 
pattern is. powerful proof of the need for federal collateral 
review of state criminal convictions, particularly in capital 
cases. Any delay in the imposition of the death penalty 
attributable to this, in their view, is legally and morally 
justified. I mention this only to emphasize the importance of 
questions about structure and administrative efficiency separate 
7. According to a 1987 report of the NAACP Legal Defense and 
_ -tL / Education Fund quoted by the Los Angeles Times on March 23, 1988, 
~ 558 death sentences had been declared unconstitutional; there 
,_~ave been 1,209 reversals on other grounds. These figures were 
.5 ~ not broken down to reflect whether the decisions occurred in 








from concerns t hat might appear to call into question the present 
scope of fede~a : habeas corpus review of state convictions. 
If . ~ 
With this in mind, here is a list of sources of delay that 
arguably can be a ddressed under the rubric of administrative or 
procedural ref or~ : 
1. There are two phases of state and federal post-conviction 
review not subject to time tables: (a) the step between 
direct appeal and th e initiation of state post-conviction review; 
and (b) the step between the conclusion of state post-conviction 
proceedings and t h e initiation of federal habeas review. In death 
penalty cases, it is not unusual for legal proceedings to come to 
a halt after a ruling by the state supreme court on direct 
~ ~ appeal. Typically, the setting of an execution date (or the 
p,,(,...W" threat to set one) serves as the stimulus to trigger further 
~ ./4,:t;_ 
S(Lf ~ legal action on behalf of the inmate. 
' 
At that point, post-
of execution is sought. 
state, however, and it 
It also places a premium 
~ conviction relie f i s initiated and a stay 
u-,-~f This ad hoc proc e s s varies from state to 
~ 
0 
inevitably leaves some cases in limbo. 
on crisis management skills. Plainly, this situation suggests the 
~ 
/4...~ utility of a statute of limitation, actually two statutes of --------. 
~-~ limitations, one federal and the other 
~~- ---- ~ state. Except for 
'. l.--1-,. Florida's two year statute of limitations,8 I know of no other 
$~ 
~ precedent for this approach. Do we need to document this problem 
~ 
~ -
in a more detaile d fashion? ~ 
---- 8. Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. 
6 
~ dt--- --
~ 5~ 2. Another source of de l ay i ~ me (and judicial energy) 
'1 :.:...> -----
1" / expended in considering reque s t s for stays of execution. ~ eath 
~ 
~ 
penalty cases, why shouldn't the operating assumption be that no 
~ -~ .....___ ----- ------ ----- ----
person will be executed unt i l he or she has had at least one --trip through the federal syst e m pursuant to section 2254. If we 
can devise a way to move cases into federal court in a more 
timely and orderly manner, t he re would probably be no need for 
the practice of setting an exe cu tion date to force the prisoner 
to take his case to the next stage of review. In this vein, a --
statute of limitation, as I conceive it, would serve the function 
that the setting of . an execu ci on date (or its threat) now does. I 
don't know how much judicial time (or energy) this would save. 
Perhaps this is something we 2~ ·) uld try to document. But, it 
seems to me that any judicial time now devoted to considering 
requests for stays of execution during the first trip through 
post-conviction review---whether at the state or federal level---
is entirely unnecessary. 
3. An other means c i sa v in g cime in the death penalty review 
i 
process wotild be the elimination of multiple opportunities for 
Court review. Presently, a skilled advocate knows that in 
penaity case he or she can get at least three chanci s e r 
(a) after state supreme court review on 
direct appeal; (b) after state supreme court review in the state 
habeas phase; and (c) after federal circuit court review in a 
section 2254 ~roceeding. 





of this process? Under this scheme, death penalty cases would 
have at least four stages of appellate or post-conviction review 
r-
in the lower courts: (a) state direct appeal; (b) state post-
conviction review (which would include trial level and appellate 
review); (c) federal district court review under section 2254; 
and (d) federal circuit court appellate review. 
Defer Supreme Court review until the entire record has been 
developed in a death penalty case. Supreme Court review at this 
( 
point would literally bring the case to an end and might enhance ' 
the sense of finality that ought to be associated with its 
actions. As it now stands, a petitiqn for certiorari is a roll of 
the dice that costs nothing to try yet in every instance buys a 
capital defendant time which obviously is precious to him. But 
( 
is the opportunity for multiple Supreme Court review essential 
\ 
to fairness in death penal-ty cases? I think not as long as we 
preserve the right to petition for certiorari when all lower 
court review---state and federal---is over. . 
Another advantage of modifying the certiorari rules in 
-------------capital cases i s that it would limit, perhaps end, the 
involvement of the Supreme Court Justices in reviewing 
applications for stays of execution. This responds to one of the 
Chief Justice's major concerns. It also is in line with my 
earlier point about devising a system which, as a matter of 
policy, does not contemplate the execution of a prisoner under 
death sentence until the completion of ~ l habeas review. 
A 
4. The total exhaustion requirement of Rose v. Lundy is 
8 
~ V t., ~ ( /.-,, /- ,J.., ~ ~ ) 
another source of delay in death penalty cases. Because of it, 
considerable time can be consumed sending a case back to the 
state system even on a single issue. Needless to say, an inmate 
under death sentence is not going to complain about this. Do the 
benefits of comity expressed in Rose outweigh the costs of delay 
at least in death penalty cases? Admittedly, the states have the 
option of waiving the total exhaustion rule, but should we pursue 
a legislative solution? A point to bear in mind here is that if 
the Committee ultimately recommends a system for the appointment 
of counsel in death penalty cases, concern about the effect of 
the total exhaustion rule will probably become moot. 9 
\r 
5. Is there a need for review in section 2254 cases by the /J 
~ ·s < 
federal district courts? Shouldn't all post conviction r evidentiary hearings and fact finding take place in the state 
system? If that can be achieved, wouldn't federal habeas review 
become tantamount to another stage of appellate review. District 
court involvement plainly can serve a screening function in death 
penalty cases, but its decision on the merits during an inmate's 
first trip t hrough the federal system is never going to be final. 
Would there be a worthwhile time savings if the system were 
changed in death cases so that upon exhaustion of state remedies, 
an inmate took his case directly to the appropriate federal 
circuit court as an appeal? This idea was first raised by 
9. Co unsel will have responsibility for developing the 
record factually and legally in the state courts. If something is 
not raised there, a federal court would not necessarily have to 
view the omission as a problem of failure to exhaust. It would 
probably be handled as a procedural default question. 
9 
"\ 
Professor Meador; in my opinion, it has a lot of potential. 
~ I_.,--,....-, '? 
III. PRINCIPAL LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS: 1973-1988 . 
Attached is a list of habeas corpus reform bills (Appendix 
1-12) introduced in Congress from 1973 to 1988. Every important 
approach to habeas corpus reform is included in this group. My 
survey shows that 10 different versions of habeas corpus reform ------- --
legislation have been since 1973. As you might expect, most of 
the recently proposed reform bills have picked up earlier 
proposals giving later proposals an omnibus quality. A summary of 
these bills follows; copies of selected bills are in the 
~ - ____,, 
appendix. 
1. HR 5217 (introduced August 11, 1988) with one notable 
exception is the prime example of omnibus legislation that has 
been presented in Congress at least 13 times since 1982. (A 12) 
It proposes these changes: 
Sykes; make( 





codification of Wainwright v. 
to both section 2254 and 2255 cases; 
of limitation triggered by the 
exhaustion of state remedies; this provision is linked to 
prisoner access to an approved state funded legal assistance 
program; the statute of limitation will not run if there is a 
state imposed impediment preventing a prisoner from filing a 




claim is based on newly discovered evidence; 10 (c) an amendment 
to section 2253 requiring a certificate of probable cause from a 
circuit judge in order for a prisoner to appeal; applicable in 
both section 2254 and 2255 cases; (d) a modification of the 
section 225 4 exhaustion requirement to permit denial of the writ 
even if a petitioner has not exhausted on all claims; (e) a 
strengthening and simpl if ication of the presumption of 
correctness which attaches to state findings of fact; the burden 
is on petitioner to rebut this presumption by clear and 
convincing evidence; (f) a codification of Stone v. Powell across 
the board to all constitutional claims fully and fairly 
adjudicated in state court. 
The three year statute of limitation i is unusual 
the application of any statute 
of ~ ~ e provision of legal assistance A._L state~~ 
expense. None of the other 12 omnibus proposals do this. The only ~ 
-- that has linked a statute of limitation to the ~ 
in two respects. First, it links 
bill 
1, ~,(,- provision of counsel was a proposal introduced by Congressman 
5./,-'V 1-~~R . . . . 
~ A.~ odino in 1974 (HR 14534). Second, all of the other omnibus 
~ vrr- 1D._) year 
.y0 •. ~ t-V...,.. proposals have a one year rather than three / statute of 
~~ limitation. 0 2. HR 72 (introduced January 6, 1987) is illustrative of 6 
~~ills that propose less sweeping habeas corpus reform than HR 
~ 
10. In my judgment, the triggering mechanism used in all of 
the statute of limitation proposals needs to be reconsidered. 
Using exhaustion of state remedies as the trigger will produce 
confusion because exhaustion occurs on an issue by issue basis at 
different times throughout state review of a criminal conviction. 
11 
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5217. (A 21) Its provisions include: (a) an expansion of the 
federal magistrate's fact finding role in habeas cases; (b) a 
codification of Wainwright v. Sykes, but in slightly different 
language than that used in HR 5217; (c) a three year statute of 
limitation that is tolled only for newly recognized rights given 
retroactive application; and (d) a strengthening of the 
presumption of correctness afforded to state factfinding by 
simplifying and rewording section 2254(d). 
3. S 211 (introduced January 6, 1987) is one of a kind. (A 
25) It is limited to death penalty cases and would deny federal 
habeas corpus consideration of state death penalty cases unless 
the petitioner ''makes a credible showing of innocence ••• " The 
restriction on access to federal court under section 2254 is tied 
to an adequate state system of direct appeal and post-conviction 
review. In other words, it is a bill that would codify Stone v. 
Powell, but only in death penalty cases. 
4. HR 2613 (introduced May 23, 1985) is an odd bill that 
attempts to tighten the legal standards for determining whether a 
claim has been exhausted under section 2254. (A 28) Not very 
clearly drafted, this bill was introduced three different times 
by the same representative, Congressman Fiedler. 
5. HR 2615 (introduced May 23, 1985) is a narrowly focused 
bill designed to prevent federal judges from granting bail to 
state prisoners while their section 2254 petitions are being 
considered. (A 30) I have been unaware that this was a problem. 
This bill was introduced twice by Congressman Fiedler. 
12 
' 
6. HR 2614 (ia troduced May 23, 1985) would prevent a state 
prisoner from atta c king a conviction based on a plea agreement. 
(A 31) Another proposal from Congressman Fiedler. 
7. S 1817 (in troduced September 25, 1979) is an example of 
six bills proposed between 1976 and 1979 that sought to reverse 
Stone v. Powell and to revive Fay v. Noia. (A 33) 
8. S 567 (introduced January 26, 1973) is illustrative of 
five bills proposed in 1973 that: (a) amended section 2253 to 
require a circuit rather than district judge to issue the 
certificate of probable cause for appeal; (b) codified the 
procedural default principle now established under Wainwright v. 
Sykes and did so for both section 2254 and 2255 cases. (A 37) 
9. HR 145 3~ (introduced May 1, 1974) proposes: (a) a 
clarification of the exhaustion requirement; and (b) gives a 
state prisoner 120 days after exhaustion of state remedies to 
file in federal court provided the state notifies the prisoner of 
the fact of exhaustion and offers him free legal assistance in 
deciding whether to apply for federal habeas corpus relief. (A 
44) 
10. HR 13918 (introduced April 2, 1974) would have required 
the federal to bear the costs of section 2254 litigation under 
certain circumstances. (A 49) 
IV. CONCLUSION 





tailored to address the special problems posed by death penalty 
cases. The most promising approach for the Committee would 
probably be to leave the substantive scope of federal habeas 
corpus review in death penalty cases as it now stands. The 
temptation to codify Wainwright v. Sykes should be resisted 
because such a proposal would trigger much more political 
resistance than it would be worth. Two other changes seem 
/ J') ---------- --
unobjection a ble as reform measures-~ mending the certificate of 
probable cause provision of section 2253 an ~ rengthening the 
presumption of correctness for state fact findings- neither . ...__;, 
one would really be helpful in death penalty • 
. ~
Two measures that would be helpful in death penalty cases 
are<Il he statute of l i mitation p ro nosal an ~ the modification of ----- . 
the exhaustion doctrine to permit the denial of the writ in 
conjunction with unexhausted cla ~ms. The utility of both of these 
proposals would be enhanced by a mechan ~ providing for counsel 
-- .., == ~ 
in death penalty cases thro ughout the- -.. en tire post conviction 
~~ CO wz ~ W.S ------ --
V' p~ e. Counsel 
~ this country fairer in many respects. 
would make the imposition of the death penalty in 
It would 
~ / L possible for courts to ensure that death penalty cases move 
a,,5 . 
also make it 
j ~ 
through the review process in a more structured and expeditious 
ft,.,c- (j_Lo.... manner. The enforcement of procedural default rules and bars to 




But, as beneficial as this might be, there 





process: (a) a ! l executions should be stayed automatically unti l 
'I ...._ 
~ ~-1--~~ ~ kl.M) ~~ ~ LlL( 






federal habeas r e view has been completed including the 
opportunity to fil 2 i certiorari petition to the Supreme Court; 
(b) each inmate under death sentence should be afforded a single 
chance to seek ce rt iorari to the Supreme Court---after all lower 
court post conv i cti o n review; (c) subject to narrow exceptions, 
ai~ ct findin g in po st conviction review should be handled in 
state court so t ha t f ederal habeas review can bypass the district 
courts and go str3 ig h t to the circuit courts. 




TO: Justice Powell April 20, 1989 
FROM: Hew 
RE: Reminder -- Habeas Developments 
There have been some new developments in the habeas area 
since the last meeting. You will want to have these in mind. 
The first, obviously, is the new statutory provision giving 
counsel to death row inmates in federal habeas. The others are 
the Supreme Court cases described below. 
1. Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. 1060 (Feb. 22, 1989): This 
is the case in which a plurality (WHR, SOC, AS, AMK; BRW concur-
ring in the judgment) of the Ct adopted Justice Harlan's ap-
proach to retroacti vi ty. The Ct held that new constitutional 
rules will be available to prisoners whose case was still on 
direct review when the new decision was handed down. They would 
not be available to habeas petitioners. Further, the Ct will no 
longer recognize new constitutional rights in habeas cases, even 
for application to the petitioning prisoner. New rights will be 
recognized only on direct review. The Court recognized Justice 
Harlan's two exceptions to the rule against retroactive applica-
tion of new rules on habeas: (1) where the new right places pri-
mary conduct completely beyond the reach of the criminal law; 
and (2) where "watershed" rules of fundamental fairness, "im-
plicit in the concept of ordered liberty," are recognized (the 
Court's example of a watershed rule was recognition of the right 
to counsel, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright). 
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2. Harris v. Reed, 109 S. Ct. 1038 (Feb. 22, 1989): This 
is the case in which the Ct, (8-0, AMK dissenting) held that the 
plain statement rule of Michigan v. Long applies on habeas as 
well as direct review. That is, absent a plain statement from a 
state habeas court that it relied on a procedural bar, a federal 
court could assume that the state court reached the merits of a 
constitutional claim, and therefore could review the merits 
without regard to any procedural bar. I note that the AMK dis-
sent in this case is Miguel's favorite opinion of those on which 
he worked with AMK. 
3. Castille v. Peoples, 109 S. Ct. 1056 (Feb. 22, 1989): A 
minor 9-0 case, which held that a claim is not considered "ex-
hausted" if the only presentation of the claim in state court 
occurred in a context where the state court would not hear the 
claim absent special and important reasons to do so. Specifi-
cally, the Ct held that use of Pennsylvania's "allocatur" pro-
ceeding was not "fair presentation" of a claim for exhaustion 
purposes. 
4. Murray v. Giarratano (now pending before the Ct): In 
this case the Ct is reviewing CA4's holding that the constitu-
tional requirement of "meaningful access" to the courts, see 
Smith v. Bounds, demands that Virginia provide individual coun-
sel to all death row inmates. The case was argued in March. I 








April 20, 1989 
Ad Hoc Committee -- April 21 Meeting 
The two major topics for the April 21 meeting are the 
substance of the Pearson memo and the future course of the 
Committee. My bottom line is: (1) I think Pearson's propos-
al is generally sound, subject to the comments below, and 
the Committee should support it; (2) Time is ticking away, 
and if the Committee is to get a proposal before the Judi-
cial Conference in September, work must begin now. 
I. PEARSON PROPOSAL 
A. Summary 
Pearson's proposal essentially would provide one coun-
seled trip through the dual system of collateral review. It 
would work as follows: Once a conviction becomes final, a 
prisoner under capital sentence would be offered counsel to 
assist with state and federal habeas review pursuant to a 
(yet to be determined) system. Once counsel is appointed, a 
statute of limitations would begin to run as to all claims 
cognizable in federal habeas. At this time, an automatic 
stay of execution would come into effect and remain in place 
until the course of review had run. The prisoner would have 
one (or two) years under the statute within which to file in 
federal court. Time would stop running ( statute would be 
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tolled) when the prisoner filed for state habeas review, and 
the statute would remain tolled during state proceedings. 
When state proceedings concluded, the statute would pick up 
(where it left off, I suppose) and the prisoner would have 
to file his federal petition within the prescribed time or 
be time barred (subject to exceptions). 
At the federal stage, the prisoner could present only 
those claims that were actually presented in state court; 
others (absent an exception) would be deemed waived/barred. 
Only at the end of federal review ( including an appeal to 
the CA without need for a CPC) could the prisoner file for 
cert in the S. Ct. Once cert was denied, the "one trip 
through" would be at an end, the automatic stay would lift, 
and the prisoner would be in the hands of the state system. 
Further federal review would be available only on one of 
three conditions: ( 1) newly recognized constitutional 
rights; (2) newly discovered evidence; or (3) prosecutorial 
misconduct that prevented earlier litigation of a claim 
(i.e., Brady violations). Only under one of these condi-
tions could a federal court grant a stay and stop the execu-
tion. 
B. Provision of Counsel 
Pearson plainly places the highest priority on provi-
sion of counsel. He outlines four "benefits" that the 
states would get from a requirement of counsel standing 
alone: ( 1) they can respond to the argument that capital 
punishment is unfair; (2) push for development of legal is-
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sues at an earlier stage; (3) strengthen the presumption of 
correctness of state fact finding under §2254(d); and (4) 
argue that procedural default rules are "fair." I am not 
sure these are really benefits to the state at all. The 
state's interest is in carrying out the sentence, which 
after all is presumed valid. The "benefits" Pearson cites 
are all improvements from the defendant's point of view. I 
do not think the Committee should endorse provision of coun-
sel standing alone; counsel must be coupled with limitation 
on duplicative review and successive petitions. 
1. Administration 
Pearson is vague about the administration of the coun-
sel provision. It seems likely that the best approach would 
be to leave specifics with the individual States. Federal 
oversight could be provided through approval of state pro-
grams by the CAs. Perhaps a federal set of criteria as to 
adequacy of funding and educational requirements would be 
needed. 
Funding is in my view a crucial problem. I think this 
is an area where the Committee will have to seek information 
from the States and from Congress. The major question is 
whether States would provide counsel at their own expense in 
return for the statute of limitations. The Committee will 
need to estimate the cost of the program, and to get some 
idea of availability of federal funds. Can the Administra-
tive Office help with the estimate? Research on these ques-
tions need not hold the Committee up, and can proceed while 
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Pearson drafts a limitations statute. 
hand at drafting a statute.) 
2. Ineffective Assistance? 
(I might also try my 
One question not answered by the memo is whether and 
when a prisoner would be able to claim that his appointed 
habeas counsel was ineffective. I think the Committee must 
be careful not to create yet another type of claim that will 
arise at the last minute in every case. I would propose 
that no claim of ineffective assistance be recognized at all 
so long as the prisoner had access to an approved attorney. 
3. Murray v. Giarratano 
In this case the Court is reviewing CA4's holding that 
death row inmates have a constitutional right to counsel in 
state habeas proceedings. Congress' 1988 legislation has 
already provided a statutory right to counsel in federal 
habeas proceedings for capital inmates. The key point for 
the Committee is that if the Ct were to find for the inmates 
in Giarratano, the poli teal "hook" on which the Commit tee 
can hang habeas reform (i.e., counsel) would disappear. Of 
course, the other Committee members do not know the outcome 
of Giarratano. There may be some sentiment to delay draft-
ing a proposal until Giarratano is handed down. This would 
be a mistake, and could delay the Committee beyond Septem-
ber. In my view, the best way to handle the issue is to 
urge that Pearson proceed to draft a proposal along the 
1 ines set out in his memo, acknowledging that it might be 
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necessary to rethink the proposals depending on the 
Giarratano result. 
C. Statute of Limitations 
I think the operation of the statute of limitations is 
generally sound, but more detail is needed. First, in an-
swer to your query, the statute would be triggered by the 
end of direct review of the prisoner's conviction or ap-
pointment of counsel, whichever came later. As you point 
out, the statute must run from the offer of counsel. The 
prisoner cannot be allowed to prevent the statute from oper-
ating by refusing an appointment. 
My main questions relate to how the statute will oper-
ate to end review after one trip through the system; the 
mechanism for forcing the prisoner to begin review is pretty 
straightforward. Pearson's memo seems to contemplate that 
the limitations period itself would operate to preclude suc-
cessive petitions, presumably because any claims would be 
more than two years old at the end of the process, and thus 
time barred. Hence, he calls his three exceptions "tolling 
rules." Of course, statutes of limitations are not normally 
concerned with preventing successive litigation. This is 
the function normally performed by doctrines of res 
judicata, which do not apply in habeas. But however the 
rule is described, the key is that all claims that were or 
were not raised in the "one trip through" are barred unless 
they fall within an exception. 
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1. The Exceptions 
Pearson proposes three "exceptions" that would allow a 
successive petition: (1) newly recognized constitutional 
rights; ( 2) newly discovered evidence; and ( 3) Brady-type 
violations that prevented earlier litigation of a claim. I 
have the following comments: 
1. Under Teague v. Lane (U.S. Feb. 22, 1989), which 
adopted Justice Harlan's approach to retroactivity, there 
will be little if any "new law" that can apply to a habeas 
petitioner. Teague allows only two exceptions -- first, 
changes in the law that place a whole category of conduct 
beyond reach of the law (in the death penalty context this 
might apply to rules that make a whole class of prisoners, 
e.g., the insane, absolutely ineligible for execution); sec-
ond, there is a Teague exception for new "watershed" rules 
of criminal procedure. The exceptions have yet to be de-
fined. 
2. I think the newly discovered evidence exception 
should provide relief in a successive petition only on a 
colorable showing of factual innocence in light of all the 
evidence. This is the approach you applied in the Kuhlmann 
v. Wilson plurality to claims that were previously litigat-
ed. It should apply in the new system to all new evidence 
claims. 
3. The Brady violation exception is really just a part 
of the second exception for new evidence. The prisoner will 
have to show good cause for not having discovered the evi-
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dence earlier. Prosecutorial misconduct is one obvious ex-
ample of "good cause" in this context. 
D. Automatic Stay 
Pearson proposes that execution be stayed automatically 
during the prisoner's "one trip" through collateral review. 
Although this is something of an affront to federalism, the 
proposal seems sensible, mainly for political reasons. I am 
aware of no prisoner that has been executed prior to one 
trip through state and federal habeas, so an automatic stay 
only formalizes current practice. It would minimize the 
need for "stay" litigation, which is always a last minute, 
"high-pressure" affair. Of course, there will always be the 
last minute stay request, asserting an exception to the res 
judicata rule: I agree with Pearson that the federal courts 
should have power to issue a stay after the one trip through 
if one of the narrow exceptions is met. But the authority 
to issue a stay must be confined to only those exceptions. 
These exceptions are narrow, and claims under them can be 
addressed far more easily than the "shotgun" stay applica-
tions that now precede every execution. 
E. Exhaustion 
Pearson's comments on exhaustion appear sound. In 
place of the present system, under which federal petitioners 
are required to return to state court with unexhausted 
claims, but then typically find themselves procedurally 
barred because of their failure to present the claims in the 
first place, Pearson proposes a simple rule: federal habeas 
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review will be limited to claims actually presented to state 
courts for adjudication. [NOTE: This is contrary to your 
memo, in which you state that Pearson proposes federal habe-
as not be limited to claims presented in state court.] As 
Pearson states, this would turn exhaustion into a "rule of 
procedural default." I note that this is essentially a cod-
ification and expansion of the rule in Engle v. Isaac, 456 
U.S. 107, 125-126, n. 28 (1982), that federal habeas courts 
may dismiss as procedurally barred an unexhausted claim if 
it is plain that the claim would be procedurally barred in 
state court -- i.e., if the return to state court would be a 
futility. 
F. CPC 
I think the ce rti f i ca te of probable cause is a minor 
issue. I am not as hostile to the CPC as Pearson, however. 
Doesn't the CPC help the CAs identify those cases that are 
frivolous? Contrary to Pearson, I think there are surely 
some frivolous cases. 
G. Conclusion 
The conclusion of Pearson's memo hits on the most seri-
ous objection to the whole enterprise: If the system is to 
be voluntary, some States will participate and some will 
not. This means that judges and lawyers will have to learn 
two complex systems of habeas review. Are the benefits 
worth it, or would it be better to try for one mandatory 
system? I am inclined to think a mandatory system would be 
better, though the problems of federal/state friction in the 
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area of funding alone would be substantial. This is an area 
where further thought is needed, but in the mean time work 
must go forward on the details of the counsel/limitations 
proposal. 
II. COMMITTEE PLANS 
A. Drafting Proposals 
Unless work on a draft proposal begins soon, I see no 
prospect of getting anything ready for presentation to the 
Judicial Conference in September. Al though numerous ideas 
have been discussed, and refinements made to the Pearson 
system (most notably by Judge Hodges), the basic idea is the 
same one that was on the table at the first meeting. The 
Committee keeps coming back to the idea of provision of 
counsel linked to a statute of limitations, and if the Com-
mit tee is going to produce a proposal in the near future, 
this is probably it. I would urge the Committee to have 
Pearson start work on the details of the proposal without 
delay. 
B. Public Comment 
I have given more thought to the subject of public com-
ment since we spoke yesterday. On reflection, I think per-
haps the best course is not to seek public comment. This 
will leave the Committee open to criticism, but such a deci-
sion could be justified on the ground that the Committee is 
composed of judges who are familiar with the problem, and 
who are proposing a solution from their judicial perspec-
tive. There will be plenty of opportunity for comment in 
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the legislative process, and public comment now would only 
slow the Committee's work. 
Whether to take comment is a close call. In the event 
you think it would be better to solicit comments, I suggest 
written comments as opposed to public hearings. Hearings 
would be an expensive, time-consuming zoo. Written submis-
sions would give the Committee all the information it could 
use. Again, if a proposal is to be ready by September, com-
ment must be solicited immediately. 
posed letter for your consideration. 
R.H.P. 
I have attached a pro-
PROPOSED PUBLIC COMMENT LETTER 
[NAME OF INTERESTED GROUP] 
Re: Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas Corpus Review in Cap-
ital Cases 
Dear 
The Ad Hoc Commitee of the Judicial Conference of the United 
States on Federal Habeas Corpus Review in Capital Cases 
seeks the views of your organization on the subject of capi-
tal collateral review. 
The Judicial Conference appointed the Ad Hoc Committee to 
study problems associated with capital collateral review, 
and to formulate legislative proposals to enhance the fair-
ness and efficiency of the present system. The Committee is 
composed of federal Circuit and District Court judges from 
the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, which have the largest num-
ber of prisoners under capital sentence. The Reporter for 
the Committee, Albert M. Pearson, is a Professor of Law at 
the University of Georgia, and has wide experience repre-
senting defendants in capital cases. 
The Committee does not intend to hold public hearings, and 
therefore requests written submissions from interested orga-
nizations. In addition to these organizations, of which a 
list is attached, the Committee will also consider submis-
sions from other groups. In view of the large number of 
organizations that will wish to be heard, the Committee sug-
gests as a guideline that submissions be limited to 50 
typed, double-spaced pages or equivalent. All materials 
should be sent, no later than July 1, 1989, to the following 
address: 
William R. Burchill, Jr., Esq. 
General Counsel 
Administrative Office of the United States Courts 
Washington, DC 20544 
On behalf of the Committee, I thank you for you assistance 
in this important project. 
Sincerely, 









April 20, 1989 
Ad Hoc Committee -- April 21 Meeting 
The two major topics for the April 21 meeting are the 
substance of the Pearson memo and the future course of the 
Committee. My bottom line is: (1) I think Pearson's propos-
al is generally sound, subject to the comments below, and 
the Commit tee should support it; ( 2) Time is ti ck ing away, 
and if the Committee is to get a proposal before the Judi-
cial Conference in September, work must begin now. 
I. PEARSON PROPOSAL 
A. Summary 
-
Pearson's proposal essentially would provide one coun- ~~ 
seled trip through the dual system of collateral review. It 
would work as follows: Once a conviction becomes final, a 
prisoner under capital sentence would be offer~d counsel to ~ 
assist with state and federal habeas review pursuant to a 
(yet to be determined) system. Once counsel is appointed, a 
statute of limitations would begin to run as to all claims 
cognizable in federal habeas. At this time, an automatic 
________, 
stay of execution would come into effect and remain in place 
until the course of review had run. The prisoner would have 
one (or two) years under the statute within which to file in 







tolled) when the prisoner filed for state habeas review, and 
the statute would remain tolled during state proceedings. 
When state proceedings concluded, the statute would pick up 
(where it left off, I suppose) and the prisoner would have 
to file his federal petition within the prescribed time or 
be time barred (subject to exceptions). 
At the federal stage, the prisoner could present only 
those claims that were actually presented in state court; 
others (absent an exception) would be deemed waived/barred. 
Only at the end of federal review ( including an appeal to 
the CA without need for a CPC) could the prisoner file for 
cert in the S. Ct. Once cert was denied, the "one trip 
through" would be at an end, the automatic stay would lift, 
and the prisoner would be in the hands of the state system. 
federal review would be available only on one of 
'r""'\,IJ""'three conditions: ( 1) ~;'i~gni zed constitutional 
~.tr It-rights; ( 2) n1::rr ~ evidence; or ( 3) f;:;;tf-du torial 
~ misconduct that prevented 
~ .,.,>z (i.e., Brady violations). 
Further 
earlier litigation of a claim 
Only under one of these condi-
tions could a federal court grant a stay and stop the execu-
tion. 
B. Provision of Counsel 
Pearson plainly places the highest priority on provi-
sion of counsel. He outlines four "benefits" that the 
states would get from a requirement of counsel standing 
alone: ( 1) they can respond to the argument that capital 


















sues at an earlier stage; (3) strengthen the presumption of 
correctness of state fact finding under §2254(d); and (4) 
argue that procedural default rules are "fair." I am not 
sure these are really benefits to the state at all. The 
state's interest is in carrying out the sentence, which 
after all is presumed valid. The "benefits" Pearson cites 
are all improvements from the defendant's point of view. I 
do not think the Committee should endorse provision of coun~ 
sel standing alone; counsel must be coupled with limitation 
on duplicative review and successive petitions. 
1. Administration 
Pearson is vague about the administration of the coun-
sel provision. It seems likely that the best approach would 
be to leave specifics with the individual States. Federal 
oversight could be provided through approval of state pro-
grams by the CAs. Perhaps a federal set of criteria as to 
adequacy of funding and educational requirements would be 
needed. 
Funding is in my view a crucial problem. I think this 
is an area where the Committee will have to seek information 
from the States and from Congress. The major question is 
whether States would provide counsel at their own expense in 
return for the statute of limitations. The Committee will 
L--
need to estimate the cost of the program, and to get some 
idea of availability of federal funds. Can the Administra-
tive Office help with the estimate? Research on these ques-
tions need not hold the Committee up, and can proceed while 
7 
7 1w I 
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Pearson drafts a limitations statute. 
hand at drafting a statute.) 
( I might also try my r 
2. Ineffective Assistance? 
One question not answered by the memo is whether and 
when a prisoner would be able to claim that his appointed 
habeas counsel was ineffective. I think the Committee must 
be careful not to create yet another type of claim that will 
arise at the last minute in every case. I would propose 
that no claim of ineffective assistance be recognized at all --- --- ~ -
so long as the prisoner had access to an approved attorney. 
3. Murray v. Giarratano 
In this case the Court is reviewing CA4's holding that 
death row inmates have a constitutional right to counsel in 
state habeas proceedings. Congress' 1988 legislation has 
already provided a statutory right to counsel in federal 
habeas proceedings for capital inmates. The key point for 
the Committee is that if the Ct were to find for the inmates 
I 
in Giarratano, the pol i teal "hook" on which the Commit tee 
t\ 
can hang habeas reform (i.e., counsel) would disappear. Of 
course, the other Committee members do not know the outcome 
of Giarratano. There may be some sentiment to delay draft-
ing a proposal until Giarratano is handed down. This would 
be a mistake, and could delay the Committee beyond Septem-
be r. In my view, the best way to handle the issue is to 
urge that Pearson proceed to draft a proposal along the 
lines set out in his memo, acknowledging that it might be 
7 
necessary to rethink 
Giarratano result. 
C. Statute of Limitations 
- 5 -
the proposals depending on the 
I think the operation of the statute of limitations is 
generally sound, but more detail is needed. First, in an-
swer to your query, the statute would be triggered by the 
end of direct review of the prisoner's conviction or ap-
pointment of counsel, whichever came later. As you point 
out, the statute must run from the offer of counsel. The 
prisoner cannot be allowed to prevent the statute from oper-
ating by refusing an appointment. 
My main questions relate to how the statute will oper-
ate to end review after one trip through the system; the 
mechanism for forcing the prisoner to begin review is pretty 
straightforward. Pearson's memo seems to contemplate that 
the limitations period itself would operate to preclude suc-
cessive petitions, presumably because any claims would be 
more than two years old at the end of the process, and thus 
time barred. Hence, he calls his three exceptions "tolling 
rules." Of course, statutes of limitations are not normally 
concerned with preventing successive litigation. This is 
the function normally performed by doctrines of res 
judicata, which do not apply in habeas. But however the 
rule is described, the key is that all claims that were or 
were not raised in the "one trip through" are barred unless 




1. The Exceptions 
Pearson proposes three "exceptions" that would allow a 
successive petition: (1) newly recognized constitutional 
rights; ( 2) newly discovered evidence; and ( 3) Brady-type 
violations that prevented earlier litigation of a claim. I 
have the following comments: 
1. Under Teague v. Lane (U.S. Feb. 22, 1989), which 
adopted Justice Harlan's approach to retroactivity, there 
will be little if any "new law" that can apply to a habeas 
petitioner. Teague allows only two exceptions first, 
changes in the law that place a whole category of conduct 
beyond reach of the law (in the death penalty context this 
might apply to rules that make a whole class of prisoners, 
e.g., the insane, absolutely ineligible for execution); sec-
ond, there is a Teague exception for new "watershed" rules 
of criminal procedure. 
fined. 
The exceptions have yet to be de-
2. I think the newly discovered evidence exception 
-------""'-- -- ""-"'- ""--"'--""' should provide relief in a successive petition only on a 
colorable showing of factual innocence in light of all the 
evidence. This is the approach you applied in the Kuhlmann 
v. Wilson plurality to claims that were previously litigat-
ed. It should apply in the new system to all new evidence 
claims. 
3. The Brady violation exception is really just a part 
of the second exception for new evidence. The prisoner will 
have to show good cause for not having discovered the evi-
- 7 -
dence earlier. Prosecutorial misconduct is one obvious ex-
ample of "good cause" in this context. 
D. Automatic Stay 
Pearson proposes that execution be stayed automatically 
during the prisoner's "one trip" through collateral review. 
Although this is something of an affront to federalism, the 
proposal seems sensible, mainly for political reasons. I am 
aware of no prisoner that has been executed prior to one 
trip through state and federal habeas, so an automatic stay 
only formalizes current practice. It would minimize the 
need for "stay" litigation, which is always a last minute, 
"high-pressure" affair. Of course, there will always be the 
last minute stay request, asserting an exception to the res 
judicata rule: I agree with Pearson that the federal courts 
should have power to issue a stay after the one trip through 
if one of the narrow exceptions is met. But the authority 
to issue a stay must be confined to only those exceptions. 
These exceptions a re narrow, and claims under them can be 
addressed far more easily than the "shotgun" stay applica-
tions that now precede every execution. 
E. Exhaustion 
Pearson's comments on exhaustion appear sound. In 
place of the present system, under which federal petitioners 
are required to return to state court with unexhausted 
claims, but then typically find themselves procedurally 
barred because of their failure to present the claims in the 
first place, Pearson proposes a simple rule: federal habeas 
- 8 -
review will be limited to claims actually presented to state 
courts for adjudication. [NOTE: This is contrary to your 
memo, in which you state that Pearson proposes federal habe-
as not be limited to claims presented in state court.] As 
Pearson states, this would turn exhaustion into a "rule of 
procedural default." I note that this is essentially a cod-
ification and expansion of the rule in Engle v. Isaac, 456 
U.S. 107, 125-126, n. 28 (1982), that federal habeas courts 
may dismiss as procedurally barred an unexhausted claim if 
it is plain that the claim would be procedurally barred in 
state court -- i.e., if the return to state court would be a 
futility. 
F. CPC 
I think the certificate of probable cause is a minor 
issue. I am not as hostile to the CPC as Pearson, however. 
Doesn't tha CPC help the CAs identify those cases that are 
frivolous? Contrary to Pearson, I think there are surely 
some frivolous cases. 
G. Conclusion 
The conclusion of Pearson's memo hits on the most seri-
ous objection to the whole enterprise: If the system is to 
be voluntary, some States will participate and some will 
not. This means that judges and lawyers will have to learn 
two complex systems of habeas review. Are the benefits 
worth it, or would it be better to try for one mandatory 
system? I am inclined to think a mandatory system would be 
better, though the problems of federal/state friction in the 
- 9 -
area of funding alone would be substantial. This is an area 
where further thought is needed, but in the mean time work 
must go forward on the details of the counsel/limitations 
proposal. 
II. COMMITTEE PLANS 
A. Drafting Proposals 
Unless work on a draft proposal begins soon, I see no 
prospect of getting anything ready for presentation to the 
Judicial Conference in September. Al though numerous ideas 
have been discussed, and refinements made to the Pearson 
system (most notably by Judge Hodges), the basic idea is the 
same one that was on the table at the first meeting. The 
Commit tee keeps coming back to the idea of provision of 
counsel linked to a statute of limitations, and if the Com-
mit tee is going to produce a proposal in the near future, 
this is probably it. I would urge the Commit tee to have 
Pearson start work on the details of the proposal without 
delay. 
B. Public Comment 
I have given more thought to the subject of public com-
ment since we spoke yesterday. On reflection, I think per-
haps the best course is not to seek public comment. This 
will leave the Committee open to criticism, but such a deci-
sion could be justified on the ground that the Committee is 
composed of judges who are familiar with the problem, and 
who are proposing a solution from their judicial perspec-
tive. There will be plenty of opportunity for comment in 
- 10 -
the legislative process, and public comment now would only 
slow the Committee's work. 
Whether to take comment is a close call. In the event 
you think it would be better to solicit comments, I suggest 
written comments as opposed to public hearings. Hearings 
would be an expensive, time-consuming zoo. Written submis-
sions would give the Committee all the information it could 
use. Again, if a proposal is to be ready by September, corn-
rnent must be solicited immediately. 
posed letter for your consideration. 
R.H.P. 
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cert in the S. Ct. Once cert was denied, the "one trip 
through" would be at an end, the automatic stay would lift, 
and the prisoner would be in the hands of the state system. 
Further federal review would be available only on one of 
three conditions: ( 1) newly recognized constitutional 
rights; (2) newly discovered evidence; or (3) prosecutorial 
misconduct that prevented earlier litigation of a claim 
(i.e., Brady violations). Only under one of these 
conditions could a federal court grant a stay and stop the 
execution. 
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States on Federal Habeas Corpus Review in Capital Cases 
seeks the views of your organization on the subject of capi-
tal collateral review. 
The Judicial Conference appointed the Ad Hoc Committee to 
study problems associated with capital collateral review, 
and to formulate legislative proposals to reduce the pro-
tracted delay in the implementation of capital sentences. 
Of course, in view of the finality of the death sentence, 
our purpose also is to ensure fairness and preservation of 
constitutional rights. 
The Committee is composed of federal Circuit and District 
Court judges from the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, which 
have the largest number of prisoners under capital sentence. 
The Reporter for the Committee, Albert M. Pearson, is a Pro-
fessor of Law at the University of Georgia, and has wide 
experience representing defendants in capital cases. 
As we are merely a committee of the Judicial Conference, we 
do not intend to hold public hearings. We therefore invite 
written submissions from interested organizations. In addi-
tion to the invited organizations on the attached list, the 
Committee will also consider submissions from other groups. 
We suggest that submissions be limited to 30 typed, double-
spaced pages or equivalent. All materials should be sent, 
no later than July 1, 1989, to the following address: 
William R. Burchill, Jr., Esq. 
General Counsel 
Administrative Office of the United States Courts 
Washington, DC 20544 
On behalf of the Committee, I thank you for your assistance 
in this important project. 
Sincerely, 
[LEWIS F. POWELL, JR.] 
Chairman 
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ADMINIS I RATIVE OFFICE OF T H E 
,.. #',!l,'-J,... 
JAMES E. MACKLIN. JR 
DEPUTY DIREClOR 
UNITED STATES COURTS 
·,y? 
WASHINGlDN, D .C. 20544 
Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Associate Justice, Retired 
Supreme Court of the United States 
1 First Street, N. E. 
Washington, D. C. 20543 
Dear Justice Powell: 
June 13, 1989 
WILLIAM R BURCHILL, JR 
GENERAL COUNSEL 
I am writing to confirm arrangements for the staff coverage by the 
Administrative Office of your committee's June 23 meeting. 
As I believe we discussed in connection with the scheduling of this meeting, I shall 
be unable to attend because that day I will be attending the meeting of Judge Coffin's 
Judicial Conference Committee on the Judicial Branch in Portland, Maine. Judge 
Coffin's committee meeting has been on the schedule since January, and I believe that 
my presence is necessary in view of the critical issues that committee is now considering 
involving judicial compensation and treatment of senior judges, among other matters. 
With your permission I would therefore like the Administrative Office to be 
represented at your June 23 meeting by Paul Summitt, our Deputy Legislative and Public 
Affairs Officer. Paul has been very interested in the work of your committee, 
particularly because he also provides staff assistance to the Judicial Conference 
Committee on Federal-State Jurisdiction which has clear interests in the habeas corpus 
,.area. Paul will be prepared to record the minutes of your meeting and to render any 
other assistance which you or the other committee members might require that is 
capable of being provided by the Administrative Office. 
I am sorry not to be able to be with you on June 23, but I look forward to 
continuing to work with you and the committee until its assigned project comes to 
fruition. With kindest personal regards, 
cc: Members of the Ad Hoc Committee 
Professor Albert M. Pearson 
FIFTY YEARS OF SERVICE 
Sincerely, 
TO THE FED ERAL JUD ICIARY 
1939 - 1989 
L. RALPH MECHAM 
DIREClOR 
JAMES E. MACKUN. JR 
DEPUTY DIREClOR 
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WASHINGlDN, D.C. 20544 
June 12, 1989 
WILLIAM R BURCHILL. JR 
GENERAL COUNSEL 
MEMORANDUM TO THE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON HABEAS CORPUS 
REVIEW OF CAPITAL SENTENCES 
I am distributing herewith the minutes of our last meeting on 
April 21, as reviewed and approved by Justice PowelL 
As I may have mentioned at our last meeting, I will be unable to 
attend the June 23 meeting because of a conflicting and preexisting 
commitment to meet with another Judicial Conference committee that 
day. Nevertheless I look forward to seeing all of you again in the near 
future at a subsequent meeting or meetings. 
Attachment 
cc: Professor Albert M. Pearson 
FIFTY YEARS OF SERVICE TO THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 
1939-1989 
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON HABEAS 
CORPUS REVIEW OF CAPITAL SENTENCES 
Minutes of the Meeting of April 21, 1989 
The Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas Corpus Review of Capital Sentences 
held its fourth meeting at the Supreme Court Building, Washington, on April 21, 1989. 
Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., presided, and all other members of the committee were 
present. Also in attendance were Professor Albert Pearson of the University of Georgia 
Law School, Hewitt Pate, Law Clerk to Justice Powell, and William R. Burchill, Jr., 
General Counsel, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts. 
Justice Powell first asked for the committee's approval of the minutes of its last 
meeting, held on January 30, 1989. These minutes were unanimously approved without 
revision or further comment. 
Noting the importance of tracking the work of the ABA Task Force on Death 
Penalty Habeas Corpus Reform, Justice Powell asked Judge Sanders to summarize the 
status of the Task Force. Judge Sanders responded that the Task Force is now 
considering 25 proposals, many of them paralleling the discussions of this committee. He 
categorized these proposals into the following issues agenda: 
1. Right to counsel. 
2. Procedural default. 
3. Exhaustion. 
4. Successive petitions. 
5. Statutes of limitations. 
6. Certificates of probable cause. 
7. Expedited procedures of whatever kind. 
8. Model time table of court proceedings. 
Judge Sanders added that the Task Force has developed a hearing schedule 
culminating with an Atlanta hearing in August and with expedited reporting deadlines 
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under which a Task Force report is expected to be approved in October or November. 
This report would then be submitted to the House of Delegates at its February 1990 
session, in order to have a legislative proposal for submission to Congress as 
contemporaneously as possible with the timetable of the Ad Hoc Committee. 
Justice Powell then called upon Professor Pearson to discuss the report on 
legislative reform proposals which he had submitted in advance of the meeting, noting 
that Mr. Pate had prepared and distributed a brief summary thereof for the committee's 
use. Professor Pearson summarized his objective as an attempt to structure changes that 
will motivate the defense bar while, at the same time, affording judges a basis to demand 
steps in the interest of efficiency. He observed that the time from the conclusion of 
state proceedings to the filing of the first Federal habeas petition has heretofore been 
unregulated, and he asserted the need for an incentive to counter the obvious motivation 
on the part of prison inmates facing capital sentences in favor of procedural delay and 
maintenance of a personal status quo. 
Thus Professor Pearson explained that he proposes a statute of limitations as an 
external constraint to allow the judicial process to go for ward and provide an expectancy 
of near-term finality. He urged that this limitations concept be linked to a mechanism 
for automatic appointment of counsel in order to avoid defaulting the rights of death-row 
inmates. He predicted that this sort of machinery would serve the same motivating 
purpose for inmates that the setting of an execution date at the state level now 
provides. In summary, Professor Pearson proposed an arrangement leaving it to the 
states to trigger this two-track mechanism leading to finality. 
At this point Judge Roney inquired as to the source of procedural delay in capital 
cases. He stated his interpretation of the statistics provided by Professor Pearson as 
showing relatively little "down time" and questioned how a one-year statute of 
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limitations could eliminate "down time" in the range of five percent. Professor Pearson 
responded that such a statute would predictably eliminate successive petitions, move 
cases, and create an expectation of finality. Judge Roney then asked whether the 
proposed exceptions to a statute of limitations would not be virtually the same as those 
considerations of law that now permit successive petitions and further inquired how such 
a statute would move cases if the state were to decide not to appoint counsel. Professor 
Pearson noted that the latter question raises the issue whether the appointment of 
counsel should be mandatory or discretionary, which has clear financial implications for 
the state treasuries. In response to Justice Powell's query as to who would appoint 
counsel, Professor Pearson responded that such appointment should probably be made at 
the state level rather than at the county or local level. The committee also discussed 
whether there should automatically be new counsel appointed following direct appeal, 
especially where the ineffective assistance of counsel is being alleged. 
Judge Roney observed that the Supreme Court has on its docket for decision this 
term whether there is a constitutional right to counsel in state habeas proceedings, and, 
if such a right is found, he questioned whether the Ad Hoc Committee would have any 
further purpose. Justice Powell stated that its proposals would undoubtedly have to be 
revised in that event but that the basic plan would presumably remain to confine inmates 
to one "trip" through the Federal judicial process, avoiding successive petitions. Judge 
Roney then renewed his inquiry as to how the proposed exceptions to a statute of 
limitations would differ from the present exceptions allowing successive petitions. 
Professor Pearson acknowledged that the exceptions foreseen amount largely to a 
statutory codification of present decisional law. He predicted that Congress will likely 
not adopt a statute without at least some specified exceptions but that these exceptions 
could be confined to a statistically insignificant number of cases. 
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Judge Sanders then advocated regularizing the system for appointment of counsel, 
thus avoiding the current problem of discontinuity of representation in collateral 
proceedings. He added that this would require the involvement of state governments and 
the expenditure of state funds. Justice Powell noted that the states may need an 
incentive to spend such money and cooperate in appointing counsel; the limitation of 
capital inmates to a single recourse to the Federal Judiciary might be such a motivator, 
in contrast to the current multiplicity of proceedings. Judge Roney conceded that this 
might speed the process but asserted that it will not solve the problem of staying 
execution. He raised the question whether states should be empowered to move to show 
cause why they should not execute prisoners, thus triggering the appointment of counsel 
for an inmate. He expressed understanding of the utility of a statute of limitations to 
avoid need for the first court-ordered stay of execution but questioned its efficacy 
thereafter. The committee then considered whether further Federal review from that 
point could practicably be precluded; its consensus was that this would be highly doubtful 
of congressional enactment. 
At this time Justice Powell suggested that a draft of the basic statutory changes 
necessary to effect the proposals under discussion would be useful in resolving the 
questions now being raised in the minds of committee members. Judge Sanders 
responded that in such draft the appointment of counsel should be assured unless waived 
by a petitioner. Professor Pearson said he awaited the committee's guidance as to 
whether the appointment mechanism should be mandatory. He noted that, as a practical 
political matter, this might require the Federal Government to subsidize state funding 
for the compensation of counsel. A discussion then took place as to the mechanics of 
required legislative drafting; it was suggested that the addition of a new section 2256 to 
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title 28, U.S. Code, might be more efficacious than to make the extensive amendments 
which would be necessary to embody the discussed concepts in 28 U.S.C. S 2254. 
Justice Powell then raised the question whether there should be a "colorable claim 
of innocence" test as the basis for consideration of successive petitions. He added that 
the Supreme Court has never determined the validity of such a test. The discussion next 
turned to the appointment of counsel for successive petitions, and the committee's 
consensus was that there should be no such obligation on the Federal courts but that the 
present judicial discretion to so appoint counsel should be preserved in the interest of 
more ready congressional acceptance. 
Judge Roney summarized his position by expressing hope that the committee 
would not limit its proposals to the framing of a statute of limitations. He reiterated the 
concern that successive petitions would not be effectively eliminated thereby. Professor 
Pearson responded that he sees the maintenance of some provision for successor petitions 
as a political necessity. He argued that creation of a free, counseled initial "trip" 
through the Federal courts would effectively eliminate successor petitions as a problem 
because there would only rarely be meritorious grounds therefor. 
Judge Clark then alluded to his previous expression that the committee should 
consider procedural changes to the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United 
States District Courts and should not rely wholly upon the remedies of statutory 
amendment. He expressed concern about a possibly inadequate fact basis for committee 
action, suggesting the danger of undue reliance upon anecdotal information and 
impressions. Judge Clark further speculated that procedural delays may be occurring at 
the Federal level and cannot be ascribed wholly to the states. Judge Hodges countered 
that his impression is the Federal courts now handle such cases efficiently. 
• 
-6-
Noting apparent committee consensus on the essential approach to take, Justice 
Powell directed that the next step is for Professor Pearson's proposals to be embodied in 
statutory form. Judge Sanders expressed support for such an approach, but he added that 
the Judicial Conference will have to expend substantial political "capital" in support of 
such legislation and that Judge Clark's rulemaking emphasis is thus an attractive and 
tempting alternative. 
Justice Powell next turned to a discussion of scheduling considerations. He stated 
that the Chief Justice's preference is for the committee to make its report to the 
September Judicial Conference this year but added that it remains uncertain whether 
this can be done and that much depends on the shape of the statutory amendments that 
Professor Pearson presents for committee review. Judge Clark then raised the need for 
a further statistical basis to support the committee's final recommendations. He 
advocated examining all 107 extant capital cases rather than being confined to the 44 
such cases from the two states already examined. Judge Roney expressed objection to 
basing all statistical analysis upon executions and suggested a further look at defendants 
who escape "death row" through the judicial process. He observed that such an approach 
would help avoid any appearance that the committee is oriented toward expedition of the 
process without regard for the substantive rights of capital defendants. Judge Clark 
raised the additional issue whether the committee's draft legislation should include any 
recommendations on the method of appointing counsel. Justice Powell responded that, at 
a minimum, such revised statute should make clear the instrumentality responsible for 
appointment of counsel 
In conclusion Justice Powell inquired as to the committee's sentiments whether 
written comments should be invited from interested organizations either as to the 
committee's general charge or the specific proposals before it. He referred to the 
.. 
-7-
previously expressed disposition against the conduct of public hearings. Justice Powell 
circulated a draft letter which he had prepared for possible dispatch to a list of relevant 
groups and associations with a declared interest and recognized expertise in the areas of 
committee jurisdiction. Judge Sanders supported the elicitation of such comments, 
saying that it would enhance the credibility of the committee's final product and improve 
its reception in Congress. After brief review of Justice Powell's draft, the committee 
agreed that it should be mailed but expedited the deadline for receipt of comments to 
June 1. Responsive comments are to be submitted to Mr. Burchill's office for 
transmission to the committee. 
Finally Judge Roney posed the question whether the committee should also 
consider other areas of the ABA Task Force's agenda. He particularly raised the issue of 
precluding or limiting Supreme Court review of state habeas corpus proceedings. The 
committee's responsive discussion focused on whether such a proposal would be 
politically practicable and could be expected to survive congressional debate. 
After consultation Justice Powell scheduled the next meeting of the Ad Hoc 
Committee for Friday, June 23, in the Supreme Court Building at 9:30 a.m. The 
committee then adjourned. 
Respectfully submitted, 
~--~~ 4e, . ff"am if ."'ffi , r. • 
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260 stonewall Heights NE 
Abingdon, VA 24210 
July 21, 1989 
Hon. Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
u.s. ct of Appeals for the 4th Cir. 
Tenth & Main sts. 
Richmond, VA 23219 
RE: New Draft Habeas Statute 
Dear Justice Powell: 
1L-M--~ 
~~ 
Al Pearsan•s revised statute reached me this morning 
in Abingdon. My general r eaction is very positive. In 
view of Al's changes, and the comments from Judges Clark, 
Hodges, and Sanders, I am hopeful that the Committee can 
find enough common ground next Thursday to move to a final 
draft in time for the Judicial Conference. 
I have enclosed a memo with rrry comments on the major 
provisions of the new draft. I have made little or no 
eomment on the parts of the statute that are unchanged. 
As to those I refer you to my earlier memo. 
My Bar Exam study is going pretty well, but I am at 
a loss to understand Negotiable Instruments. I will do 
my best not to disgrace us. 
Yours sincerely, 
~-
R. Hewitt Pate 
P.s. Note that Al has mistakenly crossed out the comments 
to sections 2258 and 2259 of the draft. These 
comments are new, and you should read them even 








TO: Justice Powell July 21, 1989 
FROM: Hew 
RE: .Prof. Pearson's 2d Draft Habeas statute 
I have reviewed the 2d draft statute sent by .Prof. 
U'k.t... kt.._/,1.'l. 
Pearson on July 20. The draft loo~s good, and hopefully there 
will be enough common ground for the Committee to move toward 
a final draft at the next meeting. I have the following 
specific comments: 
1. sec. 2256•s provisions for appointment of counsel are -
much simplified, in line with Judge Clark•s concerns about the 
intrusiveness of the procedures in the prior draft. Although 
it is important to avoid unnecessary intrusion, there may 
~ still be a need for some standards as to i) qualifications of ~ 
----------- ..L 1 · 
counsel to be appointed, and ii) amount of compensation. ~:~. 
Perhaps this could be accomplished with a minimum of complication 
and without disturbing state procedures by incorporating the JJ A ~ 
.)c/U>-' 
s~ds applicable to federal habeas appointments under the H-,... ~ k 
new federal statute. 
;,_f-4-IA- ,I_~ 
2. The new draft makes two alternative proposals in sec. 
~
2256(0) to deal with the situation where a prisoner refuses an ~ 
01;;er ~ ~p~ nte! ~ unsel~ Both proposals are tied to the  
proposition that refusal of counsel must be made with 11 awareness ~ 
and understanding" of the consequences. Some provision ~ ~ 
probably must be made for the situation, but the options in bf~. 
the draft seem likely to produce collateral 
-----?:J 




bars or time .,,,,,,..._~ 




... 2 ... 
limits of the statute. Litigation might center on 2 points: 
i) whether the prisoner had the capacity to understand the 
consequences, and ii) if he did, whether adequate procedures 
were followed to ensure that the waiver was actually made with 
awareness and understanding. 11 Assuming a provision of this 
type is needed, should it at least incor orate a waiver standard 





for Miranda waivers)? This would avoid development of a 
<L..~ 
whole new jurisprudence of 11 awareness and understanding." 
We may also need to give some thought to the relationship 
between this provision and situations where prisoners ii oppose 
efforts" to stay their executions. The Court has granted a case 
involving this situation for next term. 
3. Sec. 2256(d) provides that the state collateral counsel ~ 
shall not be the same counsel who represented the prisoner at ~ -= \ ...____ 
trial and on direc~ appeal. This was discussed at the last 
meeting and the rationale in Prof . Pearson's connnents seems 
sound. As a practical matter, is new counsel on collateral 
re~~ot already standard practice? Should the statute 
preclud-e-c9unsel staying with the case, or is there any situation ~ 
wlierethis would be appropriate? 
4. Sec. 2256(eJ provides that the performance of collateral 
-------counsel cannot be the basis of a new round of litigation. This 
is a key provision if the system is to provide finality. 
5. Sec. 2257 now provides that the federal dct that will 
have jurisdiction of the habeas petn is to issue the automatic 
stay. Prof. ~earson has clarified the provision concerning 






6. sec. 2257{b)(3) would cause the stay to expire if 
____,__,,,. -- --
t he prisoner waives his right to seek federal habeas. This 
~ - - --------- ---- -- 4 
new provision see~s unnecessary and could cause problems in 
the event the prisoner changes his mind once a warrant issues. 
Again, fihere is the prospect of litigation over the adequacy 
of the waiver. Of course, the prisoner's right to seek habeas 
relief in federal ct will expire when the limitations period 
runs in any event. There would be little harm in allowing the 
full limitations period even where a prisoner does not intend 
to seek relief, although there would be a strong appearance of 
pointless delay. Again, the rights of prisoners who 11 oppose 
efforts" and the standing of Hnext friend" petitioners who 
seek to halt executions may be relevant here. 
7. SeQ 2258 includes clarifying changes but leaves the 
time requirements essentially unchanged. The period remains a 
generous 365 days~ with tolling for cert petns following direct 
review and for state collateral review, but not for cert petns 
' following state collateral review. The provision for tolling 
during state collateral review requires that "all state filing 
rules 11 be met. This seems unnecessary -- the state cts can 
enf'orce their o~n filing rules. The comment to this section ------------~-~----
notes that a prisoner might , try6 iniu:i:tan"eousl~ file a cert 
petn following state review and a federal habeas petn. If this -
has ever happened in the past, we should find out what the 




Ad Hoc Committee 
(My summary) 
1.r 
Professor Pearson, with his letter of July 20, suggests 
a new Subchapter B. It's caption would simply be "Capital Cases: - --- - -, 
Special Procedures". 
Section 2256. Prisoners in state custody subject to 
capital sentence; appointment of counsel; requirement of rule or 
statute; procedures for appointment. 
There are three subsections. This subchapter applies only -.-
if a state 'complies with subsections (b) and (c) below. 
(a) and (b) . A state must provide, with respect to state 
=- -




for the appointment, compensation and 
~ ~ ~ payment of competent counsel. Query: Do we need a ~ 
,.~0 
~f---
standard, like the new federal standard for the qualifications of 
counsel? 
(c) Professor Pearson's draft suggests alternative language 
with respect to the appointment and acceptance by the prisoner of -
counsel. Both alternatives seem complicated to me, particularly the 
provisions as to what happens if there is doubt whether the 
prisoner accepts the state's offer of counsel. The second 13.s:;.,_/;. 
alternative would require the state to "establish and promulgate 
- ... 1 
procedures to formalize [the appointment). These would provide (i) 
that the order appointing counsel note that the prisoner had 
accepted the offer of counsel or was incompetent to accept or 
2 • 
reject it; or (ii) in an order after hearing, note that the 
prisoner rejected the offer of counsel "with an awareness and 
understanding" of what he was doing. Hew Pate suggests that the 
"awareness and understanding" language could cause litigation. The 
familiar language: "knowingly and intelligently" (Miranda wai veri' ) -f'<.-; 
- ~ ~ ~C"'--e:; :::-.,.. :J-'< i'W"),I.. 
·-- - -- -- ---- ~ would be better. ,j 2..'L-f&, 
Subsection (d) puzzles me. It would require - if I 
~,·~ 
understand 
it - that the counsel app~ in_led _Eursuant to the new statute could P,. ~ - -- - . - ~ 
~ ..,v-"~ ., be the lawyer who represented the prisoner at €rial or on ~J¥ 
~µ, direct appeal, I suppose the idea is that 
/I --:"~/t ~- '. ':\._ V J .. P ·a.!:-ipeal would be free to argue that 
the counsel on collateral ( 
trial counsel had been ) ~ 
V 
-ineffective. 
(e) As the new counsel could raise the effectiveness issue, 
this subsection would provide that the ineffectiveness of counsel 9• , 
could not thereafter "be a ground for granting relief is a 
proceeding under Section 2254 11 • 
There is no provision for the state to provide counsel ~ 
for appeals to the Supreme Court where the capital defendant loses 
his collateral appeal in state court. At present, the appointment 
of counsel in this situation is done by a court of appeals. 
New Section 2257 Mandatory stay of execution; duration; limits on 
stay of execution; successive petitions. 
( a) When counsel has been appointed as above 
ttu.~, 
12-I-~ ~ 
provided a ~ . 
""" federal court, upon application, will issue an automatic stay. ~)4). _ .,, ..w-=- 1 ~ 
~ 
3 • 
(b) Any st~ on shall expire if: 
(i) counsel fails to file a federal habeas corpus petition 
within "the time period provided in [new] section ~ 
"-~ l,.,,"'e..,t' ._ t? I ; ·':..!.. f, 
11/V>r 
c,od>t1-f 
2258"; I .,,'- 'I 




be en lv,.4 
(B) a cert petition was filed ~ ')Ml filed : for certiorari; 
and the Supreme Court denied it; or (C) a cert 
petition was due to be filed, and the Supreme Court 
disposed of it in a way that left the capital sentence 
fully in effect. 
(iii) The st~_Y shall ex12,ire if the prisoner waives the right 
to pursue federal post-conviction review under Section 
~ 
federal court [a~ter exhaustion of the foregoing 
or waiver thereof] shall have authority to enter a stay 
of execution or grant relief in a capital case unless: 
(i) the alleged basis for the stay of execution had not 
previously been presented in the state or lower federal courts; 
(ii) the facts in the application create doubt as to the 
guilt of the defendant; and 
(iii) the failure to raise the claim is (A) the result of 
state action in violation of the Constitution or federal law; (B) 
a federal right newly recognized by the Supreme Court; (C) or new 






My Comment: Although the foregoing seems unduly complicated, 
Al notes that these clarifying changes [that seem too detailed] 
were based on questions raised by committee members when we last 
met. ~ mpha~~ in his commen.t ~ ;iwPir- S!?:f= ll §'al t that an 
a~ omatic st~y,. t gJses e~ t when cou~se1 is appoi~ted. The purpose 
of the provisions of Section 2257 is to limit the authority of the 
federal courts to stay execution and grant relief after one fair 
trip through federal post-conviction review. 
Section 2258. Filing of habeas corpus petition; time requirements; 
tolling rules. 
This provides for a one-year statute of limitations } i,v--/Vof 
within which a petition for federal habeas may be filed. The 365 .z;_~ 
days run from the filing in state court of the order prescribed in M~ 
t . ' ' . . CefU1,«,~ Sec ion 2256(c). This is the order in which the state offers to 
t 
provide counsel for an indigent state prisoner sentenced to die. ~ --HJ"'tA 
I • 
But the one-year period of limitation will be tolled: ~~ 
(a) from the date of the filing of a petition for cert with ~ 
the Supreme Court and until final disposition of 
counsel for the prisoner has filed a petition for 
the case wh /~f~ en . 
I 
1/L,., 
cert from the ~ -
state supreme court following its affirmance of the capital 
sentence. 
.. , . -:--- . .. -
5. 
(b) The one-year limitation also will be tolled during any 
period in which the state prisoner has filed for post-conviction 
review. But the filing requirement shall not be tolled during the 
pendency of a petition for certiorari for the Supreme Court 
following state post-conviction review. 
(c) This provides for a further tolling of sixty days when 
good cause is shown for additional delay. 
Section 2259. Evidentiary Hearing: scope of federal review; 
district court adjudication. 
(a) When the state prisoner files for federal habeas corpus 
relief, the district court shall: 
(i) shall determine th~ sufficiency of the evidentiary 
record to consider the claims presented. Where there are 
"unexhausted claims", these shall not be considered unless the 
prisoner can show good cause and prejudice. See Wainwright v. 
Skyes. 
(ii) When a state prisoner files for federal habeas, the 
district court also must consider any requests for a evidentiary 
hearing and conduct such a hearing when necessary to complete the 
record. 
(b) When the record is satisfactory, the district court shall 
rule on the merits . 
. ,.-, ; .. ~=,-· .. ,r--. .•• 
r;,. 
6. 
Section 2260. Certificate of probable cause inapplicable. 
This is simply a provision to the effect that no longer is a 
certificate of probable cause required before a court of appeals 
may review a habeas corpus case. 
* * * 
My Comment: , The foregoing changes, at least on their face, seem 
unduly complicated. Some also seem fairly obvious, and perhaps 
could be omitted. There is some merit to Chief Judge Clark's view 
that we should leave more decisions to the discretion of the state 
and federal courts. I nevertheless am inclined to agree with Hew 
that this may be a draft we could approve. 
Our accompanying statement is quite important. It could 
well incorporate much of Judge Clark's draft, but should place 
greater emphasis on the overall fairness of the proposed changes 
in the law. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
? .,l! . .d-,r'~-,v../ ~ ~ f f,-'-
;rv-v ~ f;C..,..1 ~ ~ z. 7 '1 
~fl:Ov ~ 
c~. '1d 
CHAPTER 153. HABEAS CORPUS 
Subchapter A. General Provisions [a proposed redesignation] 
[sections 2241-2255 would not be changed.) 
Subchapter B. Review-e£ Capital Cases Sen~eneing: Special 
Procedures [new] 
Section 2256. Review-e£ -ea~i~al-sen~eneing-waen Pr isoners in 
state cus tody subject to capital sentence;-
appointment of couns el; requir ement of rule of 
court or statute; pr ocedures for appointment 
(a) This subchapter shall apply to cases arising under --------
section 2254 of Title 28 involving prisoners in state custody who 
are subject to a capital sentence. It shall apply only if the 
-
provisions of subsections (b) and (c) concerning the appointment 
of counsel are satisfied . -~ Ne-statttte-er-rttle-e£-eettrt-in 
een£liet-with -this-sttbehapter-sh all-be-en£ereed-in-a-preeeeding 
te-whi eh-this-sttbehapter-is-appl i eable. 
(b) To make the procedures ass ert-the-expedited-pest- 5 ted:;:_ 
~ 
eenvietien-review-preeedttres-in-seetiens-2258-and-2~59 of this ~ 
/ 
r~ 
subchapter applicable, a state must establish by rule of its f;;Z~ 
. . ~~ s-. 
hzghest court of last resort or by statute a mechanism for the 
1 
... 
appointment, compensation and payment of reasonable litigation -----, 










capital sentence. The rule of court or statute must provide ~'+-~ 
/.)..f~~ 
I 
satis£y-tfle-£e±±ewiflg-additieflal-eeflditiefls~ for representation i.-t-t-~ 
~~ 
of indigent prisoners whose capital sentences have been upheld on 
direct appeal to the court of last resort in the state or whose 

























[(c) If the state 
~,_j:;,, A 
~-y•ulu I v--f 
.,· / .. -"1 •"· V..f'._ ~ l ,,,-)..L._-/-- fer.-- /.1.._ 
nism for the appointment of 
~}, counsel as in subsection (b) it shall offer to a oint 
'1 (_{~)~,.,, competent counsel to all indigent state prisoners under capital 
tvf y I 
, sentence. If the prisoner accepts the offer of appointment, an 
order appointing one or more counsel to represent the state 







the court of conviction. After proper notice of the offer to 
a ppoint competent counsel, if the state prisoner 
re~ ~'3D 1 
offer or does not respond to the offer within ? days from 
receiving it, the state shall take reasonable steps to ascertain 
whe ther the prisoners's refusal of the offer of counsel or 
failure to respond reflects an awareness and u nderstanding of 
2-
the consequences . If the refusa l of the offer of counsel or 
I\ 
failure to respond r eflects an awareness and understanding of 
the consequenGes , an order to that effect, after a hearing and a 
factual showing by the state, shall issue and be entered in the 
appropriate records of the court of c onviction. If the refusal 
of the of f er of counsel or failure to respond i s not based on an 
awareness or understanding of the consequences a nd the prisoner 
is incapable of such awareness a nd understanding, an order 
appointing one or more competent counsel to represent the state 
prisoner shall issue and be entered in the appropriate records of 
the court of conviction.] 
4 
CJ, /4--n..~r,-f,,{~) - J4.v,.. j,j 
[(c) If the state adopts a mechanism for the appointment of 
counsel as provided in subsection (b), it shall offer to appoint 
competent counsel to all indigent state prisoners under capital 
sentence. The state shall further establish and promulgate 
procedures to formalize this process which shall include the 
requirement that the court of convic tion or some other designated 
court enter: (1 ) an order appointing one or more counsel to 
represent the prisoner and noting that the prisoner accepted the 
offer or was unable competently to decide whether to accept or 
reject the offer; or (2) an order, after any necessary hearing, 
noting that the prisoner rejected the offer of counsel and made 
the decision with an awareness and understanding of its legal 
consequences . ] 
tet-Whefl-~he-ehie£-atts~iee-e£-ehe-highes~-eettf~-e£-a-s~a~e 
appeifl~s-afl-a~~effley-as-pfeviae a-ifl-sttesee~iefl-tet,-he-sha±± 



















(d) No person appointed pursuant to subsections (b) and (c) 
to represent a state prisoner under capital sentence shall have 
~ 1, 
-k 
c; . .//4~ 
previously represented the prisoner at trial or on direct appeal -?-t....~.........-
c .., .kM.--J..L-L 
in the case for which the appointment is made. 
6 
~ 
,e) The ineffectiveness or incompetence of counsel during ~ 
~t-~ t..,,k._,,tJ-, 
state or federal est-conviction review in a ca ital case shall W-'-~,h1A.. 
,a-f"tr 
-not be a ground for granting relief in a proceeding arising under 
28 USC §2254. 
COMMENT: ✓,;hi s section establishes the scope of this 
legislative propos al. It is a scaled down version of the first 
draft. V AS in the first draft, it makes the subchapter's 
applicabil i ty depend on the existence of a state mechanism for 
the appointment of counsel in state p ost-conviction review. 
However, in this draf t most of the details concerntng the system ~rtrl> .. -i:), 
orJ?roviding representation are left up to the state. One point 
~
ears emphasis: the proposa1 attempts to encourage the 
~
ointment of counsel ~for state post-convict~on r._eview. It does 
obligate the states to fund certiorari peti ti ..dri_s to the 
~ reme Court under ~any circumstances. This is~ue may become 
~~-'VY important if and when this proposal is debated down the line. 
f~w-1.JJi~rV: P esently, the only time a state prisoner under capital sentence 
✓ ould be entitled to counsel before the Supreme Court appears to 
be after a final order by one of the circuit courts of appeals. 
~. 21 USC §848(q)(8). 
~ 'Y; 
~ t · In subse2_tion (c), I have pro~ose~ :sw_g_ alte_£natives. The ,\v procedure s are designed to make clear when the subchapter is /. 
triggered. I am not happy with the language in either ~ ~ 
alternative. The wording of the second alternative is less 
cumbersome than the f i rst. In any event, cer tainty in this 
r egard is important to the integrity of this proposal. There 
~needs to be a public record of (1) the appointment of counsel or 
~µV t (2) a finding that the prisoner refused the offer of counsel and 
{ d i d so c ompetently. If a prisoner can't g rasp the significance 
o f his r efusal to accept the offer of appointment, then 
s ubsection (c) would require the state seeking t o make this 
subch apter applicable to go ahead and appoint counsel anyway. 
Subsect i on (d) requires that state post-conviction counsel 
b e different from a state prisoner's trial and appellate counsel. ~ 
This" insures a second look at th c se and makes it possible for 0 
a legif imat i nquiry into .the competency of trial and appellate 
counsel to be undertaken. 
Subsection (e), however, makes clear that the competency of 
counsel at the state and federal post-conviction phases is not a 
litigable issue at least when a petition is filed under section 
7 
2254. If a problem arises, the remedy should be the appointment 
of new counsel when a case reaches federal district court. 21 
USC §848 (q). Whether previously unlitigated issues can be 7 ~ 
injected into the case at that juncture will depend on whether I 
the requirements of section 2259 and/or Wainwright v. Sykes can 
be satisf i ed. 
Section 2257. Mandatory stay of execution; duration; limits on 
stays of execution; successive petitions 
(a) Upon the filing in the court of conviction of an order 
issued Rttflfliflg-£reffl-ehe-e££ee~ive-aaee-e£-ehe ~ r appointing 
counsel pursuant to section 2256(c), any order p r warran~ setting 
an execution date for a state prisoner under capital sentence 
shall be subject to automatic stay upon application to any 
federal court that would have jurisdiction over any proceeding 




~hae-has-1ttrisaieeiefl-eve~-~he-stt~jeee-fflaeeer. The application 
----... 
must recite o}(y that t he state has invoked the post-conviction 
rev i ew procedures e s tablished by this subchapter and that the 
scheduled execution is subject to automatic stay. 
(b) Any stay of execution granted pursuant to subsection (a) 
shall expire if: 
8 
tet-~he-s~ay-e£-exeett~iefl-att~heri~ea-ey-~his-see~iefl-sha±± 
remaifl-ifl - e££ee~-~hrettghett~ - a±±-s~ages-e£-pes~-eeftvie~ieft-review, 
ifle±ttdiflg-afly-~ime-peried-dttriflg-whieh-a- ease-is-peRdiRg-£e~ 
eeRsidera~ieR- er-dispesi~ieR- ee£ere-~he - BRi~ed-S~a~es-Sttpreme 
eettr~.--l~- sha±±-expire-att~ema~iea±±y-i£~ 
(1) Counsel for the state prisoner fails to file a 
h abeas corpus petition in the proper federal district court 
~ vt,a.}{-J?~ 
within the time period provided in section 2258; ~365-aays-e£-~he 
LL~}, 
e££ee~ive-aa~e-e£-his-appeiR~meR~-ttRae~-see~ieR-i!i!56. Jf,,._Q~ /'- {..~/ £ ;.," 
if't cU/.2-1-. 9 , A- I} ,'d,,. ll~ r 
(2) Upon completion of state and 1lower federal court 
, '\' 
~ r- ~ _,. -• v c · A-- _,·nJ · · · 
post-conviction revi e~: (A) the time for filing a petition for 
certiorari has expi red and no petition was filed; (B) a timely 
peti tion for certiorari was filed and the Supreme Court denied 
the petition; or (C) a timely pet ition for ce r tiorari was filed 
and upon consideration of the case, the Supreme Court disposed of 







pe~i~ieR-er,-ttpeR- eeRsiaera~ieR-e£-aRy- gttes~ieRs-eR-~fte-meri~s, 
ftas-aispesea-e£-~fle-ease-iR-a-maRRer-~fta~-ieaves-~fte-eapi~ai 
sefl~eftee-ttfldis~ttrhea~ 
(3) Before a court of competent jurisdiction, in the 
presence of counsel and after having been fully advised of the 
consequences of his decision, a state prisoner under capital 
sentence waives the right to pursue federal post-conviction 
review pursuant to 28 use §2254. 
(c) No federal court thereafter shall have the authority to 
enter a stay of execution or grant relief in a capital ifl - ~fle 
case unless: 
(1) the basis for the stay and request for relief is a 
claim not previously presented in the stat e or lower federal 
courts; 
(2) the facts underlying the claim are sufficient, if 
proven, to undermine s ~ an~~ally the court's confidence in the 




offenses for which the death penalty was imposed; and 
(3) the failure to raise the claim is (A) the result of 
state action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the 
United States; (B) based on a federal right newly recognized by 
the Supreme Court that is retroactively applicable or (C) based 
on a factual predicate that c ould not have been discovered 
thr ough the exercise of reasonable diligence in time to present 
the claim for state or federal post-conviction review. 
COMMENT: This redraft incorporates clarifying changes based 
on comments and suggestions from Committee members. Subsection 
(a) makes an automatic stay of execution applicable3 hen_counsel 
is_ ~ ed o r f fie offer of counsel- is refused under section 
2256(c). The application for stay, if necessary, must be filed 
in the federal district court that would have jurisdiction over 
the section 2254 petition. Subsection (b) similarly tries to 
clarify the scope of the stay of execution provisions. In 
subsection (b)(3), it should be noted that I included a provision 
authorizing the lifting of an automatic stay when a state 
prisoner under capital sentence waives his right to pursu e review 
under section 2254. I don't want to invite unnecessary 
controversy by incorporating this provision into the draft but 
its rationale seems obvious. 
Subs ection (c) limits the authority of the federal courts to 
stay executions and grant relief after one trip through federal 
post-conviction review. The addition of the language referring 
to the granting of relief makes the authority of a federal court 
to stay executions upon the filing of a successive petition 
coextensive with the authority to grant substantive relief. 
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Section 2258. Filing of habeas corpus petitions; time require-
ments; tolling rules 
Counsel appointed under section 2256 to represent a state 
t:t-
prisoner under capital sentence must sha¼¼-~ffe-~he petition for 
habeas corpus in the appropriate federal district court within 
365 days from the filing in the state court 1ot con1ti,c:t;.ion\ of an 
~
....__ 
order issued pursuant to section 2256(c). e££ee~ive-aa~e-e£-~he 
~ 
appeifl~mefl~-~y-~he-ehie£-otts~iee-e£-~he-highes~-eettr~-ifl-~he 
sea~e~ The time requirements £i¼iflg-rtt¼e established by this 
section shall be tolled as-£e¼¼ews: 
(a) Bttriflg - ~he-~ime-periea-rttflfliflg From the date of the 
filing of a petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court until 
the date of final disposition of the case, if counsel for the 
state prisoner files a petition for certiorari following the 
affirmance of his capital sentence on direct appeal by the court 
of last resort highes~-eettr~ of the state;~ 
(b) During any period in which a state prisoner under 
capital sentence has a properly filed request for post-conviction 
12 
J,.,,--" 
review pending before a state court of competent jurisdiction; if 
all state filing rules are met in a timely manner, this period 
shall run continuously from the d a te that the state prisoner 
initially files a request for post-conviction review of his 
capital sentenc e in the court o f conviction or other proper trial 
court until final d i sposition o f the c ase on appeal by the 
-....: •• J. 
highest court of the sta te;~ The filing requirement established 
by this section is not tolled during t he pendency of a petition 
for certiorari before the Supreme Court following state post-
conviction review. 
(c) During a period not to exceed 60 days, if counsel for 
the sta te prisoner: (1) moves for a n extension of time in the 
federal district court that would have proper jurisdiction over 
the case upon the filing o f a habeas corpus petition under 28 USC 
§2254 and (2) makes a s h owing of good cause for counsel's 
I io 
inabi l ity to file the habeas corpus petition within the )-65 day 
period established by this secti on. ~he-me~ien-£e~-ex~ensien-e£ 










ttpfte l a-efl-aireet-appeal-afla-alse-permit-state-pest-eeflvietiefl 
review.--!fl-esseflee,-36S-aays-is-allewea-£er-ease-preparatiefl-ifl 
aavaflee-e£-afly-eettrt-£iliflgs.--Assttmiflg- flew-eettflsel-eeme-iflte-tfte 
ease-a £ter-a££irmaflee-e£-t fte-eeflv i etiefl- afla-eapital-seflteflee-efl 
airee t -appeal, - tftey-wettla- ftave-a - great-aeal-e£-time-te-learfl-tfte 
ease, - eleet-te- petitiefl-£er-eertierari-i£-tftat-step-seemea 



















Section 2259. Evidentiary hearings; scope of federal review; 
fdistrict court adjudication~ ftransfer-te-eettrt 
ef-ap:peals-£er-aajttdieatien~ 
(a) Whenever a state prisoner under capital sentence files a 
petition for habeas corpus relief under this chapter, the 
14 
district court shall: 
(1) determine the sufficiency of the evidentiary record 
for the purposes of federal habeas corpus review based on the 
# claims actually presented and litigated in the state courts. 
Unexhausted claims shall not be considered except when the 
prisoner can show that the failure to raise or develop a claim in 
the state courts is (A) the result of state action in violation 
of the Constitution or laws of the Un ited States; (B) based on a 
federal right newly recognized by the Supreme Court that is 
retroactively applicable; or (C) based on a factual predicate 
that could not have been discove r ed through the exercise of 
reasonable diligence in time to present the claim for state post-
conviction review; and 
(2) consider and rule upon any request for an 
evi dentiary hearing and conduct any evidentiary hearing 
necessary to complete the record for the purpose of federal 








(b) fUpon the development of a complete evidentiary record, 
the district court shall rule on the merits of all claims 



























Section 2260. Certificate of probable cause inapplicable 
The requirement of a certificate of probable cause in order _, ~ 
g 
to appeal from the district court to the court of appeals does 




COMMENT: No changes from first draft. ·. Judge Hodges 
suggested tha~ the certificate of probable . c~use requirement be 
revived when successive petitions are filed ~nder this 
subchapter. Given the restrictions. on successive petitions in 
section 2257, I don ~t think many prisoners will have-, a chance of 
getting the stay of executjon that they will :need to litigate any 
appeals on the merits. On the other -hand, . if . the ~requirements 
for a stay in section 2257 are satisfied as far as a court of 
appeals is concerned, that is tantamount to saying that probable 
cause for the appeal exists. The certificate of probable cause 
requirement would appear to be redundant in that situation. --
July 25, 1989 
Subject: Agenda for Talk With W.H.R. 
The Chief Justice returns from France today (Monday) , and 
I may talk to him tomorrow about the following: 
The Ad Hoc Committee (draft of Professor Pearson July 
20th, copy to be delivered to The Chief by Mike Levy Tuesday 
morning. 
I should ask Mike also to give The Chief a copy of 
Charles Clark's letter and draft. 
Also talk to The Chief about Dean Sullivan's letter of 
July 11, and give The Chief a copy. 
L. F. P. , Jr. 
7 ~ {'·t O ~ 1 ~ > j 
Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas 
July 27, 1989 General Agenda 
~..:i ~ (3 ..a.13 ~~ 
✓ 1. Approval of Minutes 
\,h . Report on ABA Committee 
J a. Judge Sanders 
~ -~ (f. 
1IU., ~ 





4. Prof. Pearson's Revised Draft Statute. 
-'\ 
5. Compare Drafts 
a. Much in common. 
6. Committee must decide. 
a. Report to C.J. by Sept. 1st 
b. Accompanying Statement will be important 
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UNITED STATES COURTS 
.,."Ov . S~v 
WASHINGlDN, D.C. 20544 
August 22, 1989 
Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Associate Justice, Retired 
Supreme Court of the United States 
1 First Street, N. E. 
Washington, D. C. 20543 
Dear Justice Powell: 
\I 4 AUG 1939 
WIU..IAM R BURCHILL, JR 
GENERAL COUNSEL 
I am transmitting for your consideration my draft of minutes for our 
July 27 meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on Habeas Corpus Review. 
I shall await your direction as to sending these minutes to the other 
committee members. Since we do not have a further meeting scheduled, 
you may wish to invite them to submit any editorial changes or 
emendations by mail. 
It has been both a privilege and a real pleasure to work with you and 
with the Ad Hoc Committee. I hope to see you at the Judicial Conference 
on September 20. If I may be of any further assistance in the meantime, 
please let me know. I should add that I am scheduled to be on vacation the 
first two weeks in September, returning to the office on Monday, 





JUDICIAL CONFERENCE AD HOC COMMrITEE ON 
HABEAS CORPUS REVIEW OF CAPITAL SENTENCES 
Minutes of the Meeting of July 27, 1989 
The Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas Corpus Review of Capital Sentences 
held its sixth meeting at the Supreme Court Building, Washington, on July 27, 1989. 
Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., presided, and all other members of the committee were 
present. The Chief Justice visited with the committee briefly at the commencement of 
the meeting and expressed optimism at the prospect that the committee would shortly be 
ready to submit its report to the Judicial Conference. Also in attendance were Professor 
Albert Pearson of the University of Georgia Law School, reporter for the committee, 
Hewitt Pate, law clerk to Justice Powell, and William R. Burchill, Jr., General Counsel, 
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts. 
Justice Powell began by asking for the committee's approval of the minutes of its 
last meeting, held on June 23, 1989. These minutes were unanimously approved without 
revision or further comment. 
Next Justice Powell asked Judge Sanders to relate any new developments 
regarding the ABA Task Force on Death Penalty Habeas Corpus since the committee's 
last meeting. Judge Sanders stated that no further meetings of the Task Force had 
occurred. He also referred to correspondence of the Task Force's reporter, speculating 
that its present consensus is there should be no priority for Federal habeas proceedings. 
Judge Sanders further related that other developments have been occurring through 
correspondence within the Task Force. In summary, the committee and Task Force are 
on largely parallel tracks with the recognition that the Task Force's charter is a broader 
one. The Task Force has expedited its time schedule with its next meeting to take place 
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in Atlanta in late August, at which time there will be public hearings with a long witness 
list. 
At this time Judge Clark distributed for the consideration of the committee his 
suggested draft of its final report. Justice Powell then called upon Professor Pearson to 
review the changes to his draft of proposed legislation that were agreed upon at the last 
meeting. Professor Pearson stated that the major change is to frame the obligations of 
the states so as to give them more latitude in invoking the procedures of new section 
2256 of title 28. Another change which he enumerated had occurred in the definition of 
persons eligible for appointment as counsel: this reflected the expressed view that there 
is no need to mandate a change of counsel on appeal where all parties are satisfied to 
retain petitioner's original lawyer. 
Judge Hodges inquired whether this draft legislation would apply only to indigent 
petitioners and questioned the desirability of erecting a possible double standard between 
indigents and others. Professor Pearson responded that states would wish to be able to 
invoke this subchapter by making the requisite offer of counsel to all defendants under 
capital sentence, although there would be no need to appoint counsel for those 
defendants who have funds. As a practical matter, he noted, virtually all capital 
defendants have been indigent, but some of them have volunteer counsel. In summary, 
the offer of counsel is envisioned as a mechanism to trigger the procedures of the new 
subchapter, although it is recognized that some defendants may not qualify to avail 
themselves of this offer. 
Judge Hodges then asked if the proposed statute should explicitly declare whether 
non-indigent defendants will come within its time limitations. Professor Pearson thought 
that this was an open question, while Judge Clark suggested that the present draft 
already provides the answer. After further discussion Professor Pearson recommended 
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requiring the states to off er counsel to all state capital prisoners, subject to their 
meeting the qualification of indigency. Judge Sanders voiced his preference to handle 
this problem through a change to proposed section 2258. Additional discussion then 
occurred on the question whether the mere off er of counsel by the state would constitute 
a sufficient triggering mechanism. Ultimately Judge Clark suggested a change of 
language as shown on page five of the edited statutory draft that had been distributed. 
This proposal received general agreement. 
Further discussion then took place on proposed section 2256(d) and its provision to 
permit counsel to continue on appeal where all parties so desire. An agreed change was 
made to section 2256(e) to ref er to state or federal collateral post-conviction 
proceedings. Judge Hodges noted that section 2256(c) nowhere places a time frame on 
the appointment of counsel and raised the question whether this should be done. 
Professor Pearson responded that a clear incentive for the states is being created and 
that it should then be left to them. Judge Clark predicted that the mechanism would 
work equitably and uniformly in its present form. Justice Powell agreed, but 
Judge Roney expressed concern that there will be no contribution to the process unless 
states voluntarily see fit to take advantage of this device. 
Judge Sanders observed that under this draft the state would decide the issue of 
counsel's competence and that this question would then be forever foreclosed. Professor 
Pearson agreed that this is a fair interpretation of the draft. Then Judge Hodges pointed 
out that the statute as proposed would not permit federal litigation of unexhausted state 
claims. He added that this principle would apply if the issue of trial counsel's 
competence were not raised at the state level. Judge Hodges expressed the view that 
this does not present a problem because the statute would require the appointment of 
competent counsel, although admittedly this is a subjective determination. 
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Professor Pearson then summarized the proposed changes to be made to section 
2256 of the draft legislation: 
add a third option to paragraph (c) where there is an 
adjudication of non-indigency; 
in paragraph (d) authorize the continuation of 
representation by trial or appellate counsel if the 
defendant so requests, counsel agrees, and this 
arrangement is approved by the court after hearing; 
the clarification suggested by Judge Hodges to 
paragraph (e), adding "collateral1' and substituting 
"proceedings." 
Discussion then continued on the issue of competency of counsel. Several 
members observed as to the difficulty or impossibility of defining "competency" with 
Judge Sanders expressing concern that the statutory draft before the committee would 
implicitly define it by lessening the ability to raise it as an issue. Judge Roney raised the 
question whether the standard for legal competence in the post-conviction context is 
properly a federal or state issue, and Judge Sanders questioned whether the discrepancy 
among federal judicial districts as to what constitutes competent representation can be 
alleviated. 
At this point Justice Powell posed the question whether the committee should add 
to subsection (e) a federal standard of competence. Judge Roney responded that the 
issue is not truly competence but effectiveness in a given case. Judge Sanders 
speculated as to the effect of removing subsection (e); Judge Clark responded that its 
retention will not pose a problem if defendants have the right to litigate whether this 
system applies to them or not. Judge Hodges then suggested removing the "competent" 
modifier from subsection (c), and the committee agreed to this approach. Professor 
Pearson noted that this change is consistent with the purpose to eliminate case-by-case 
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adjudication of attorney competence and define this standard instead on a statewide 
basis. 
Justice Powell then moved the discussion to proposed section 2257. Professor 
Pearson summarized the changes incorporated as a result of discussion at the last 
meeting. At the suggestion of Judge Hodges it was agreed to add to section 2257(b)(2) 
explicit language requiring the petition to have been denied, on the basis that it would be 
desirable to state this clear assumption. Other minor changes as shown in the revised 
text were agreed to. Judge Roney noted in summary that in the situation of successive 
petitions the approach of this draft would be to remove as an issue the correctness of the 
death penalty and focus solely on the issue of the defendant's guilt. There was general 
agreement with this analysis. 
The discussion then shifted to proposed section 2258. Judge Sanders expressed 
satisfaction that the new version is more understandable, but he raised the question of 
the tacking of time periods. After discussion there was general agreement that the use 
of the word "toll" is sufficient to evidence the intent for tacking. It was observed that a 
change had been made in the lead-in to this section to clarify that its requirements apply 
to all capital defendants, including those who do not qualify financially for appointed 
counsel. 
Justice Powell raised the fundamental question whether the proposed stay of 
execution pending the filing of a habeas corpus petition should remain 365 days, as 
proposed. Judge Hodges responded that he would support a revision to 180 days, but 
Judge Sanders questioned whether such a reduction would create political difficulties for 
the committee's recommendations and misperceptions thereof by Congress. After 
additional discussion the committee agreed to recommend only a 180-day period but with 
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the recognition that this will be a pivotal issue before the Judicial Conference in its 
review of the committee's report. 
Discussion then occurred on proposed section 2259 with particular reference to 
the question whether the court must rule on all habeas claims if relief is granted as to 
one of them. There was the general consensus that courts should rule comprehensively 
on all claims. It was agreed that the proposed language on page 16 of the draft required 
no change but that this statement of the committee's philosophical view would be made 
explicit in the commentary. 
Next the committee considered proposed section 2260 with respect to the 
inapplicability of the certificate of probable cause requirement for capital habeas 
petitions. Judge Clark recommended omitting this section on the premise that 
maintaining the requirement could save a small amount of time. Judge Roney suggested 
that there is an inconsistency in applying the certificate requirement only to some 
categories of habeas cases. Justice Powell then proposed omitting section 2260 from the 
committee's recommended statutory draft. Judge Clark agreed, but after further 
discussion it was decided to retain this section with the addition of language qualifying it 
so as not to cover second or successive petitions. 
Justice Powell directed Professor Pearson to effect the added changes to the 
statutory language agreed upon by the committee today and then to consider 
Judge Clark's suggested language for a committee report. He expressed the intention to 
meet the required time schedule to bring the report before the Judicial Conference on 
September 20. Judge Clark noted that this goal could be met if the report reaches the 
Executive Committee of the Conference in time for its scheduled meeting on August 24 
to finalize the Conference agenda. It was agreed that Professor Pearson would distribute 
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the amended statutory language by mail on August 7 and then proceed to finalize the 
report. It was further agreed that no additional meeting of the committee appeared 
necessary. 
In conclusion Judge Roney inquired whether the committee had now concluded all 
of the business that the Chief Justice had assigned it. Judge Hodges raised the question 
whether conforming changes would be necessary in the rules under 28 U.S.C. S 2254, but 
Professor Pearson responded that he had considered this need and found no changes 
required. Judge Sanders asked whether any further comment should now be invited on 
the committee's proposed work product. Justice Powell answered that scrutiny by the 
Judicial Conference would be sufficient, and this became the consensus of the 
committee. The committee then adjourned with no further meeting plans. 
Respectfully submitted, 
William R. Burchill, Jr. 
